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CHAPTER 1 “MEAN-SQUARE STABILITY AND ADAPTIVE LEARNING IN REGIME
SWITCHING MODELS”
INTRODUCTION
Recently, the Federal Reserve has experienced some changes in the top leadership.
Most notably, we witnessed the confirmation of a new fed chief, Janet Yellen. Moreover, Federal
Reserve Governor Jeremy Stein announced his resignation from the Board of Governors while
Cleveland Fed President Sandra Pianalto announced her position, both effective in May 2014.
These resignations place a watchful eye on the next nominations whom will fill positions on the
Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC).

Stein and Pianalto were characterized by their

neutrality on the committee, neither being too “hawkish” or “dovish” when deciding monetary
policy. Some believe that the FOMC could be headed for a shift in the balance of power, which
would result in policy formation different from what we have been witnessing.
These shifts or swings can be interpreted as regime changes in monetary policy. Although
the idea of changing regimes isn’t novel, it is still an important dynamic when trying to understand
and create monetary policy. To model the stochastic nature of regimes, economist have been
using variables characterized by Markovian properties in order to help understand the dynamics
of the model under seemingly random transitions. In recent years, economists have focused on
the stochastic nature of interest rate movements, using Taylor’s (1993) general result, the Taylor
Principle. Guided by the stability conditions set forth by Lucas, the Taylor Principle describes the
set of responses from the monetary authority for long-run stability. Yet recent studies by Farmer,
Waggoner, and Zha (2009) and Cho (2012, 2014) find that the Taylor principle is complicated by
the use of Markov switching regimes and that long-run stability under these conditions can be
tumultuous. In response to these findings, this paper focuses on the conditions necessary to
ensure stability by introducing a new methodology for characterizing long-run stability, MeanSquare Stability (MSS).

2
Using the model of monetary hyperinflation proposed by Cagan (1956), I am able to build
on the ideas presented by Branch, Davig, and McGough in their recent paper which explores the
relationship between Markov switching models and adaptive learning. Since the Federal Reserve
appears to be headed for a change in regimes, this is an appropriate time in macroeconomics to
analyze how regime changes affect the expectations of economic agents.

Modern

macroeconomics relies heavily on rational expectations equilibria that it still remains the
benchmark for alternative measures of expectations. Adaptive learning is an important deviation
from the norm, since it allows agents to posit the value of future, key parameters, unlikely known
even by a trained economists. The inclusion of adaptive learning into economic modeling has
offered an appropriate alternative to rational expectations since its comprehensive introduction
by Evans and Honkopohja in 2001. While more recent literature has begun to integrate adaptive
learning within the context of Markov switching regimes. Moreover, this paper questions the
robustness of E-Stability or stability under adaptive learning, by exploring the relationship that
mean-squared stability has to traditional forms of stability under rational expectations.
While using the method of mean-square stability, the primary result of this paper is that
Markov switching model equilibria are learnable in the sense that they are E-stable. This is an
important result as it provides tractable procedures and outcomes for determinacy. Furthermore,
using a simple open economy model, I outline the determinate and indeterminate set of parameter
values guiding monetary policy.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section dives into the recent
and pertinent literature surrounding these topics while Section 2 describes the Cagan model and
explains the role of both adapted learning and the Markov-switching parameters. In section 3, I
explore the role of Mean-Square Stability in evaluating determinacy and begin to address the
connection to the Minimal State Variable solution. Section 4 provides a detailed analysis of
adaptive learning and provides the conditions necessary for long-run stability. Conclusions and
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further discussion are in Section 5. The appendices house the details of the model, methods and
results that have been employed.
LITERATURE REVIEW
The literature surrounding regime switching models is robust. Recent monetary policy
papers, spanning the time of Volker to Bernanke, have focused primarily on the empirical analysis
of the Taylor principle. Davig and Leeper (2007) in their AER paper analyze a conventional new
Keynesian model supported by a long-run Taylor principle using an evolving monetary policy.
Using a one-county new Keynesian model, they allow monetary policy parameters to fluctuate
according to a Markov process. What Davig and Leeper create is a baseline for both empirical
and theoretical work which looks at the combination of policy parameters required to find a unique
determinate equilibrium.

Moreover, they set up a simple closed economy to examine the

empirical practices found in changing monetary policy. They find that a determinate equilibrium
depends greatly on the combined magnitude of monetary policy parameters. Davig and Leeper
conclude that even while using parameter values consistent with providing determinacy to their
model, indeterminacy can exists due in part to persistent regimes but also because there can be
expectation changes regarding future regimes. Ultimately, they find that these issues can
contribute to dramatic increases in inflation volatility, as well as, important parameter choices
endowing their model with a unique equilibrium. These sentiments are also echoed by a couple
of recent papers from Farmer, Waggoner, and Zha [FWZ] (2010) and Branch, Davig, and
McGough (2013).
FWZ, extend the analysis to permit the inclusion of forward looking model components.
This extension is important since many rational expectations frameworks include forward looking
macroeconomic variables. Here they build a guideline for finding the forward solution for a onecounty new Keynesian economy.

By including the rational expectations framework, FWZ

describe the solution to their model as the minimal state variable solution [MSV] as proposed by
McCallum (1983). The MSV solution provides a stable, bounded, unique solution which coincides
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with the theory governing the Taylor rule. That is, the response of the monetary authority when
setting interest rates must be larger than one-for-one to the change in inflation. One important
conclusion to their analysis is that FWZ produce a parameterization that yields a seemingly
determinant equilibrium. Yet upon closer inspection their solution exhibits an indeterminacy that
can exist even when monetary policy follows the Taylor rule. This is because of the interaction
between the Markov switching regimes. This spillover between regimes is not captured with
traditional determinacy analysis and requires a novel approach to the problem. The exposure of
this flaw, coupled with the importance of expectations are the main motivators for this paper. This
paper bridges the gap in the literature, with a new understanding of determinacy among Markov
switching models as a result from the exploitation of the engineering literature.
The most comprehensive paper to date, which comprises both monetary policy and
adaptive learning, within a Markov switching regime, has been recently published by Branch,
Davig, and McGough (2013). Branch et al. build on the conclusions of Davig and Leeper and
understand that agent expectations play an important role in the long-run equilibrium in a similar
new Keynesian framework. As a result they incorporate the use of adaptive learning to model
misspecification in an agent’s understanding of the deep parameters which govern key
endogenous outcomes. Relying on the foundations of a MSV solution with a “bubble” component,
Branch et al. outline a solution method and determinacy conditions for two types of forward looking
expectations models: History Dependent Regimes [HDR] and Regime Dependent Equilibrium
[RDE]. Somewhat intuitive, the HDR is guided by the notion that an agent conditions their
expectations on past regimes whereas the RDE sees agents condition only on current ones.
These forward looking models, acknowledge the possibility of but ultimately exclude bubbles, i.e.
self-fulfilling expectations, as an attainable equilibria.

Their paper highlights a unique, stable

MSV solution which coincides with a stable equilibrium under adaptive learning. As an empirical
test, they develop a simple one-country, new Keynesian example to see if regime switching
equilibria are learnable. Their parameterization fails to find an indeterminacy but does concede
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one can exist. What they forgo becomes an instrumental conclusion of this paper: the necessary
conditions for finding the set of indeterminate and determinate solutions. Explored extensively in
the engineering literature, mean-square stability is a much stronger set of conditions than
commonly used conditions outlined by Blanchard and Khan (1980). MSS takes into account the
complexity of the Markov switching regimes and extends the conditions to capture the spillover
effects each regime imposes, something Farmer et al. previously recognized. By extending the
model from a one-country closed economy to one that is open, I am able to include a parameter
sensitive to changing exchange rates within the monetary policy function. Further testing the
validity of the Taylor rule.
Taylor himself, in a 2001 AER paper, argues that exchange rates are indeed imbedded
into the policy equation of a closed economy, similar to the way new Keynesian models, explored
by Branch et al. and Farmer et al., obviously fail to capture any importance they may play.
Moreover, he argues that modern monetary policy often includes exchange rate parameters but
systematically turn the sensitivity to zero, if they follow the so called Taylor rule that he proposed
in 1993. Here Taylor responds to varying criticism over exchange rate inclusion in monetary
policy. The most vocal was Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) who argued that “rule of thumb” changes
may be a better monetary policy rule. That is the positive fluctuations in the exchange rate require
a negative response from interest rates. Furthermore, they argue that since the theoretical
purchasing power parity fails to hold up in the short run as well as over a longer time frame,
reactions to exchange rates may be undesirable. But Taylor smartly dissects the discouraging
findings and argues that at the very least there are indirect consequences from changing
exchange rates. What could be a motivating factor for including the changes in the exchange
rate is the stochastic nature of forward looking domestic variables, inflation and output. The model
presented in my paper accepts the empirical limitations of PPP, but continues to find the role
exchange rates play in monetary policy.
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Two recent attempts at compiling a model which includes both learning and Markovswitching parameters comes from Bask (2006) and Ellison, Sarno, and Vilmunen (2007). Ellison
et al. provide a theoretical interpretation of the two-country model presented in similar fashion to
Walsh (2003). They recognize that by using a more complex global economy, the model is able
to capture perceived informational spillovers created by both central banks.

Coordination

between banks appears to be the most valuable resource for creating a stable economy but it
also allows each central bank to exploit the exchange rate for their own advantage. In order to
capture this, they build into their model a Baysian learning mechanism that permits central banks
to learn how to best exploit the exchange rate. They believe: “any benefit from one central bank
learning how to exploit the other then needs to be weighed against the cost of the other central
bank also learning how to exploit.” One criticism of their model that I address in this paper is that
they greatly simplifies the role exchange rates play. They introduce exchange rates into both the
aggregate demand and supply equation as endogenous drivers of output but then they remove
exchange rates from these equations through the Uncovered Interest Parity (UIP) condition. The
UIP links the differential in real interest rates to the difference in the exchange rate today from
expected future exchange rates. Moreover, exchange rates do not appear in the Fisher equation,
their monetary policy rule, thus rendering the sensitivity of each monetary authority to the
fluctuations of exchange rates nonexistent. Furthermore, since their monetary policy rule is
assumed to not produce any systematic biases, they conclude that the expectation of future
variables, like home and foreign inflation levels, will be zero. It follows then, that the future
expected exchange rate is also zero. Completely removing any trace of the exchange rate.
Through these decisions the exchange rates acts exogenously and is not needed in their analysis
of fluctuating policy and regime changes.
Bask presents a simple open economy, similar to the model developed by Gali and
Monacelli where the exchange rate is imbedded into the new Keynesian Phillips curve and the
aggregate demand curve. Moreover, they support the model with an uncovered interest rate
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parity condition similar to what I present in this paper. Lastly, Bask investigates a variety of Taylor
policy equations that includes the exchange rate differential in a lagged, contemporaneous, and
forward looking positions. The principle conclusion presented by Bask is that monetary policy
sensitive matters. Specifically, the monetary authority can ignore exchange rate fluctuations as
long as the reaction to inflation is sufficiently large. Although this treatment from Bask includes
E-stability it fails to include the possibility of Markov switching regimes.
One of the main conclusions of this paper is finding the conditions necessary to ensure
mean-square stability under adaptive learning, thus ensuring E-Stability. The foundation of MSS
in economics comes from a recent paper by Farmer, Waggoner and Zha (2009). In their paper,
they begin to analyze the role regime switching models have had in recent years and build a
framework for the necessary and sufficient conditions to “determine if the parameters of a Markovswitching rational expectations model lead to a determinate equilibrium.” Using a forward looking,
reduced form model similar to what I use in this paper, I am able to use the necessary and
sufficient conditions and apply them to a different class of expectations.

One of the main

conclusions of my work is the formation of a theorem which reveals that MSV solutions which are
mean-square stable are also E-stable under adaptive learning.
THE CAGAN MODEL OF HYPERINFLATION
For the purpose of this analysis, I employ the standard Cagan model of monetary
hyperinflation. The framework is used primarily because it is easily tractable and features a
stochastic, forward-looking component. The model is outlined as follows,

=

( ̅

∗
,

)

(1)

where M and P denote the level of money and process. The expectations operator in Cagan’s
model is assumed to be adaptive expectations. That is the agent makes expectations of time t+1,
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during time t using a weighted average of current and past price levels. For my analysis, the
expectations operator coincides with adaptive learning.
−

−

= (log

= (log

−

−

̅) −

̅) −

∗

(

−

)

The level of output, , and the real interest rate, ̅ , are assumed to be constant. For simplicity,
the constant term can be removed by setting
−

=− (

= ̅ = 0.
−

)

(2)

where m and p are the log of money and the price level. The left-hand side of equation (2)
represents the log of real money.
=

where

+

(3)

> 0 and the intercept term can be dropped. Cagan identifies

as coefficient on the

velocity of money. In this regard, one would expect the velocity to be positive as interest rates
increase. This is because money should turn over more quickly as the opportunity cost of holding
money rises.
The main result of this model is that the forward solution exists as long as the limit of
expected future prices goes to zero and that the limit of money supply is finite. Therefore when
the no bubble conditions are met, prices depend on the velocity of money and the money supply.
I amend Cagan’s assumption that the velocity of money is constant to an assumption that the
velocity of money is state dependent. Where $ represents a possible m state Markov process
taking values {1,…..,m},

=

(% )

+

(% )
(% )

(4).

For this analysis, I assume that $ is only a two state Markov process and that $ evolves

according to the transition matrix,

&='

1−

))

1−

))

*,
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where & = +

,- ./0

2, 3 = 1, 2 with

,-

being the probability that $ = 3 given that $

= 2. The

characteristics of the transition matrix are taken to be recurrent and aperiodic implying a unique
stationary distribution.
The model simplifies to the reduced form, non-linear, expectational difference equation
with form1

6 = 7($ ) 6

+ 8($ ) ,

where 6 is the 9 : 1 vector of endogenous variables, 7($ ) and 8($ ) are assumed to be

invertible, conforming matrices, dependent on the Markov process $ .

Further simplifying the Cagan model requires a linearization of the equations. Similar to

the framework developed by Branch, Davig, and McGough (2013) conditioning the structural form
of the model on each regime, $ , creates the following system,
6

=7

6) = 7)

6< = 7<

)

<

6

6

6

+7

+ 7)

+ 7<

)

))

<)

6)

6)
⋮

6)

+ ⋯+ 7

+ ⋯ + 7)

<

)<

+ ⋯ + 7<

<<

this system, now linear can be re-written in a reduced form as
6> = ? 6@

+A .

6<

6<

6<

+8

,

+ 8) ,

+ 8< ,

(5)

G )G
G )G
As does Branch et al., I define ? = (⊕<
> = (6 G , 6)G , … , 6<
and A G = (A G , … , A<
-C 7- )(&⨂EF ), 6

and where ⊕<
-C 7- = I2JK(7 , 7) , … , 7< ).

This definition is important to the results formed by Branch et al. as it provides the exact

condition needed for a unique uniformly bounded solution. That is, the eigenvalues of ? =
(⊕<
-C 7- )(&⨂EF ), must lie inside the unit circle. A simple condition labeled, Conditionally Linear
1

For the full form of the model refer to Appendix A.
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Determinacy Condition (CLDC), provides the link to a regime dependent equilibria (RDE) through
the MSV-solution.
Equation (5) corresponds to a multivariate linear rational expectations model but more
importantly to a MSV-solution. The stacked system with well-known solutions characterized by
McCallum (1983), is an important link for Branch et al. which defines expectational stability. Their
analysis reveals the conditions which provides a uniformly bounded solution to the stacked
system. Whereas this paper uses the MSV-solution result to form the conditions needed to
provide a MSS-solution to equation (5).
THE MINIMUM STATE VARIABLE SOLUTION
The solution of the reduced form multivariate linear rational expectations model can be
compared to the minimal state variable solution proposed by McCallum. Davig and Leeper offer
a MSV-solution of the form,

6 = Β($ ) .

Branch et. al. identify the solution of this form as a Regime Dependent Equilibria (RDE)
and come to the conclusion the MSV is a RDE. They believe that the model, in this form can be
solved using the techniques from Blanchard and Khan (1980). Standard techniques dictate that
if the rational expectations equilibrium is unique the solution is determinate while indeterminate if
there are multiple equilibria. Branch et al. reveal that their determinate condition is integral to one
of their primary tenants: the characteristic root conditions which governs stability, the CLDC, is
analogous to the Long-Run Taylor Principle created by Davig and Leeper (2007).
In their simple framework, Branch et. al. are able to create the conditions necessary to
insure the stability of the model. They corroborate the findings from Farmer, Waggoner, and Zha
which identifies the possibility of multiple equilibria occurring because of the positive feedback
occurring from regime changes.
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MEAN-SQUARE STABILITY
Stability concepts do not vary too much in the literature. Branch et al., as well as Davig
and Leeper, use a familiar form of stability which relies on bounded stability. Farmer et al. are
among the firsts to propose an alternative idea of stability, requiring the first and second moments
of a stochastic process to be finite. I take up Farmer et al. and Cho’s (2014) arguments for using
MSS, which include 1) the ability to characterize a large set of stochastic processes that are
covariance stationary, 2) relevant macroeconomic literature generally assumes unbounded,
covariance stationary stochastic processes like normally distributed shocks, and 3) unlike the
boundedness criteria for determinacy, the conditions for MSS in MSRE models has very tangible,
immediate applications for analysis. Below, I outline the concept of mean-square stability using
the work of both Cho and Farmer et al..
In my paper, I propose the use of an alternative method for analyzing stability in this class
of models, Markov Switching Rational Expectations models (MSRE). By using Mean Square
Stability (MSS) conditions models that may have positive regime feedback can be correctly
analyzed for stability while using the criteria of a MSV solution. This is imperative considering the
class of solutions the MSV satisfies, including adaptive learning.
Farmer et al. begin by adopting the indeterminate solution method written by Lubik and
Schorfheide (2003, 2004) where they use a combination of the MSV-solution and a first-order
moving average component. It can be written as,

6 = MN + O

O = ΛO

+ QA .

Some important considerations are that the shock term, A , is stable, zero-mean, and is also a

non-fundamental disturbance that may or may not be correlated with the shock term N . A is also

R dimensional, where R is the number of explosive eigenvalues. It follows that Λ is an n x n matrix
of rank k, which can be written in the following form,

Λ = QΦV G .
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Lubik and Schorfheide, by writing the solution in this form, have essentially removed any
doubt from the question if there is a unique determinate solution. The question that is now posed
from this form, is if this is a stable stochastic process. They use this methodology to show that
monetary policy in the U.S. during the 1960s and ‘70s produced indeterminate results by not
satisfying the well understood Taylor principle.2
This paper diverges from the canonical literature regarding stability in adaptive learning,
since the concept of stability that I employ is mean-square stability rather than bounded stability.
The formal definitions of both MSS and bounded stability are as follows,

Definition 1 An 9 : 1 stochastic process 6 is mean square stable (MSS) if there exists an n x 1
vector 6 and an n x n matrix Q such that U2 ( X6 Y − 6) = 0F Z J9I U2 ( X6 6 ′Y − \) = 0F Z F.
→W

→W

Definition 2 An n-dimensional process 6 is bounded if there exists a real number N such that
‖6 ‖ < _, /0 JUU `.

where ‖∗‖ is a well-defined norm. It’s important to note that if the process 6 is MSS it follows
that it is also boundedly stable.

For linear systems, these two concepts are identical for

determining uniqueness of the equilibrium but in Markov-switching models, these two ideas are
not the same and an economist must choose between the two. For a bounded process to be a
tractable within this type of model, all possible products of the coefficient matrices must have
characteristic roots inside the unit circle. No known conditions exist at this time for analyzing a
bounded process.
Definition 3 The stochastic reduced form, state dependent model is said to be determinate if
there exists a stable fundamental solution, and there is no association of a stable nonfundamental solution, the stochastic component O with the fundamental solution.

Intuitively definition 3 proposes that a stable solution can exists if a stable bubble fails to exist.

Agents must not be able to create a self-fulfilling stable equilibrium.

2

For a practical example please refer to pg. 11 from Farmer et al. (2009)
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The following lemma characterizes the solutions to the stacked system, regardless of MSS
and the conditions for existence a MSV equilibrium.
Lemma 1 Any solution to equation the stacked system can be written in the following way:
6 = M% N + O ,

O = Λ% a

,%

O

+ Q% Q%G 8 ,

where Q% is an 9 : R% matrix with orthonormal column and 0 ≤ R% ≤ 9, 8 is an arbitrary ndimensional shock process s.t.
Q% Φefa

G
,% Q% a

cQ% Q%G 8 d = 0, Λ % a

for some R% : R% a matrix Φefa
i

Γ, Q, = h
-C

,%

,%

is an n x n matrix of the form

s.t.

,- Q- Φ,-

/0 1 ≤ 2 ≤ ℎ,

And M% N is the minimum-state variable (MSV) solution with M% representing the conformable
coefficient matrix from the forward looking component of the stacked system.
Proof See Appendix.
Lemma 1, originally from Farmer et al. (2009), provides an important result for the stacked
system. The form of the solution is similar to the Lubik-Schorfheide representation of linear
systems. Their representation comprises both a fundamental and non-fundamental component,
the MSV solution and the moving average vector respectively. The result indicates that the
moving average component is indeed a Markov switching system, and thus can be subjected to
the necessary and sufficient conditions for determinacy.
DETERMINACY USING MEAN-SQUARE STABILITY
Again following the framework provided by Lubik and Schorfheide, Cho considers a
solution which includes both a fundamental and non-fundamental (sunspot) solution.
fundamental component of a Linear Rational Expectations model takes on the form,
: = XΩ($ ):

+ Γ($ )l Y + O ,

where O , is a non-fundamental component of the form,

The
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O =

)YO

Xm($ , $

.

It is important to note that the coefficient matrices in both the fundamental and non-fundamental
components must satisfy the following conditions for each regime, $ J9I $
Ω($ ) = nEF −
Γ($ ) = nEF −

m($ , $

) = nEF −

Xo($ , $

)Ω($

Xo($ , $

)Ω($

Xo($ , $

)Ω($

,

)Yp q($ ),

)Yp r($ ),

)Yp o($ , $

).

Cho and Farmer et al. emphasize the complexity of determining the stability of the nonfundamental components. Cho proves that the non-fundamental solution can be written in the
following way:

O

)O + Q($

= Λ($ , $

)Q($

)G A

,

where Q($ ) can be thought of as a 9:R($ ) matrix with orthonormal columns, 0 ≤ R($ ) ≤

9 J9I R($ ) > 0 for some $ . A is an arbitrary 9 : 1 innovation s.t.

Λ(st , $

) = Q($

)Φ($ , $

)Q($ )′ for some R($
v

Q, = h
-C

where Q, = Q($ = 2), Φ,- = Φ($ = 2, $

,-

where 6

is a 9 : 1 vector, M($ , $

) x R($ ) matrix Φ($ , $

m,- Q- Φ,- , /0 1 ≤ 2 ≤ w,

= 3) J9I m,- = m($ = 2, $

Consider the following stochastic process:
6

XQ($

= M($ , $

) and x($

)6 + x($

)A

)Q($

)G A

) $. `.

= 0F Z ,

= 3).

,

) are 9 : 9 J9I 9 : U matrices respectively. A

is an arbitrary U : 1 vector assumed to be mean-square stable. In order to work with a model
similar to the MSRE models, Cho transforms the stochastic equation so that both G and H depend

on $ , while the disturbance term is measured at time t. To assess MSS, we will focus on the

homogenous component of, the stochastic process. Let M,- = M($ = 2, $
matrices can be defined:

= 3). The following
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Definition 4 The spectral radius of an n x n matrix M is defines as
„ , … , „F are the eigenvalues of M.

⋯
⋯
⋯

• (?)

= max (|„, |), where
‚,‚F

The engineering literature that defines the determinacy and indeterminacy of MSS, proposes the
following theorem.3

Theorem 1 The stochastic process, 6

} z⊗z is less than one. That is
of Ψ

}

, is mean-square stable if and only if the spectral radius

• +Ψz⊗z .

< 1.

Adapting Theorem 1 to the MSRE models requires the fundamental solution have the same form
as stated above, again assuming the vector of shock terms is already mean-square stable. That
is : = Ω($ ):

+ Γ($ )l is mean square stable if and only if
}

< 1,

}

< 1.

• +Ψ…⊗… .

As for the non-fundamental component O = Λ($
stable if and only if

• +Ψ†⊗† .

, $ )O

+ Q($ )Q($ )G A , O is mean-square

Again, we assume the sunspot error term is white noise. Thus we get the following theorem.

3

For further information regarding the notation and creation of the MSS matrices, please refer to Costa (2005).
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Theorem 2 The stochastic process, with both fundamental and non-fundamental components is
found to be uniquely determinate under mean-squared stability if and only if
}

• +Ψ†⊗† .

< 1.

}

• +Ψ…⊗… .

< 1, and

Proof. See Definition 1.
Theorem 2 says that the non-fundamental component must satisfy the MSS conditions. If this
occurs, there is no sunspot equilibria competing to govern the dynamics of the regime switching
system.
ADAPTIVE LEARNING AND E-STABILITY
Current monetary policy can be confusing even for a seasoned economist. As the Federal
Reserve is transitioning to a new chair president, speculation in regards to policy changes most
likely will increase. Speculation regarding policy is often seen as a driver for investment volatility.
Recent Fed policy aims to create a greater transparency in policy expectation by announcing
current and future plans.

But it is important to note that the inner workings of policy decisions

are very complex and hinge on the understanding of key, dynamic relationships.

As

macroeconomics moves forward as a science, previous ideas of these relationships need to be
edited in order to accommodate new vision.

One such idea that has endured is Rational

Expectations (RE).
From its inception and then application, RE has disseminated into macroeconomics thus
becoming the standard for all forward-looking models. As noted by Branch, Davig and McGough
(2013), “A given forward-looking macroeconomic model may admit classes of rational
expectations equilibria that differ in terms of the set of state variables that agents use when
forming expectations.”
A direct response to these criticisms of RE is Adaptive learning (AL), which allows agents
to have close to rational expectations. This allows agents to have reasonable idea regarding the
system which motivates the economy but fails at knowing the exact parameter values. Thus
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agents learn about these parameters over time. Over the last 20 years, the methodology behind
AL has been thoroughly researched, starting with the idea of bounded rationality emphasized by
Sargent (1993, 1999), and then the didactic work from Evans and Honkapohja (1999, 2001).
In their book regarding the application and methodology behind AL, Evans and
Honkapohja (2001) explore the use of Markov switching parameters and the effects of sunspot
equilibrium. What their book and recent literature lacks though is a comprehensive treatment of a
more complex international macroeconomic model. My research begins to fill that void; it pieces
together a model which explores issues previously ignored, such as exchange rate fluctuations.
MULTIVARIATE ADAPTIVE LEARNING FRAMEWORK
This section builds up the framework necessary for providing a link between the MSVsolution, mean-squared stability, and E-Stability. I assume that agents are able to observe the
transition probabilities of each state, $ but do not observe the vector of endogenous variables,
6 . These assumptions feel plausible considering agents can fully observe the transition of

leadership in the monetary authority but cannot fully observe the economic variables driving the
model. As Branch et al. note, this is standard within the AL literature, which assumes agents only
observe contemporaneous exogenous variables but not endogenous ones.4
Using the reduced form model, equation (8), agents observe the set of equations
governing the dynamics of this system and

where

∗

6 =?

∗

6

is an ambiguous expectational process,

+A ,

is defines by the form,

=‡

+ ˆ . It is

further assumed that 0 < ‡ < 1 and ˆ is a white noise process. Providing the determinacy of M,

under RE there exists a unique stable equilibrium of the form 6 = B .

4

Branch et al. note that this assumption only appears to be strong but is in fact also assumed in the rational
expectations literature. It is because the literature on adaptive learning strives to replicate the results rational
expectations do researches continue to use this assumption.
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Under learning, agents build their forecasting model without the knowledge of parameter
values, this is referred to the Perceived Law of Motions (PLM),
6 =o+q .

Following the MSV-solution setup, in this form, the conformable, well-behaved, parameter
matrices A and B capture the perceived relationship between the endogenous vector of variables,
6 and the error term,

. Adaptive learning provides the econometricians the opportunity to

estimate matrices A and B through different learning algorithms, e.g. recursive least squares.
Agents learn by using the data available to them up until time t, and forecast using their
PLM,
∗

6

=o

+q

‡ .

Plugging their forecast back into the reduced form yields the Actual Law of Motions (ALM),
6 = ?o

Assuming that agents know the evolution of

+ (?q

‡ + A) .

, it becomes clear how forecasts of endogenous

variables, in time t, depend solely on the perception of determined last period, o

and q

.

When new information becomes available, agents update their perceptions, o and q to make

new forecasts on the endogenous variables.

This process continues until the perceived

parameter matrices either diverge or coincide with the rational expectations equilibrium. When
they coincide the model is said to be stable under learning; that is (o , q ) → (0, B) almost surely.

To illustrate this condition, known as E-Stability, we look toward the generic beliefs of the agents,
(A, B). The ALM defines a function, or map, whereŠ: ℝ) → ℝ).
Š(o, q) =( ?o, ?q‡ + A).

To find an equilibrium from the T-map, one must only look for the fixed point in the map. This
point identifies the rational expectations equilibrium (REE). E-Stability is then determined by
“moving” locally around this fixed point and observing the asymptotic convergence. If the fixed
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point of the ordinary differential equation (o.d.e) is locally asymptotically stable then the REE is
said to also be E-Stable,
•(Ž,•)
••

= Š(o, q) − (o, q).

Intuitively, the o.d.e. is thought of as the forecasting error produced by the agents. As Branch et
al. put it, “if the resting point of the o.d.e. is stable then adjusting parameters in the direction
indicated by the forecast error will lead the parameters toward the REE.”
Fortunately, this is fairly easy to compute. Local asymptotic stability can be assessed
using the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix DT.

E-Stability within state-contingent models

arises when the eigenvalues have real parts of modulus one. Branch et al. bring readers to their
main tenet: The derivative of the Jacobian matrix, which governs E-stability, coincides with the
matrix that satisfies the Conditional Linear Determinacy Condition. This connection between MSV
and E-stability, especially within a regime-dependent equilibrium, is paramount to their results.
E-STABILITY AND MEAN-SQUARE STABILITY
The connection between mean-square stability and E-Stability relies heavily on the CLDC
created by Branch et al. That is, I prove if a solution, in the form of a MSV also satisfies the
conditions for MSS it is E-stable through the CLDC.
In order to insure that the MSS solution coincides with the MSV solution, Farmer et al.
provide the following corollary to Lemma 1.

Corollary 1 Let 0 ≤ R, ≤ 9. Consider the problem of choosing 9 : R, matricies Q, and R- : R,

matricies ‘,- such that
∑i-C

,- Q- ‘,-

J9I Q,G Q, = E– , .

•

’? +‘,- .“ is minimized subject to the constraints ”, Q, =

If, for all possible choices of nR , ⋯ , Ri p, not all zero, the minimum value of the

•

’? +‘,- .“

is greater than or equal to one, there will be only one mean-square stable solution to the model.
This solution is the MSV solution. Otherwise there will be multiple solutions to the stacked system.
Proof See Appendix.
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Indicated by Farmer et al., MSS implies the bounded stability conditions found in most
economic analysis including that of Branch et al.. That is, if the necessary and sufficient conditions
are met for MSS then they also imply the existence of a unique uniformly bounded solution.
Farmer et al. do not offer any formal proof as they cite it is a widely known result from the
engineering literature. Thus, a MSS solution satisfies the condition of a CLDC. This is formalized
in Proposition 1 below.
First, I must establish the central results from Branch et al. with Lemma 2 and 3.
Lemma 2 If the CLDC holds then there is a unique RDE that corresponds to the MSV-Solution.
Proof See Appendix.
Lemma 2 describes the realization that any RDE solves the stacked system. This follows
from the proof shown in the appendix. Again the fault in their analysis stems from the weak
conditions for creating the CLDC. Recall, that the CLDC only requires the characteristic roots of
the coefficient matrix in the stacked system to be within the unit circle. With that noted, Lemma
3 provides the connection for E-stability.
Lemma 3 If the CLDC holds, then the unique RDE is E-stable.
Proof See Appendix.
Proposition 1 A unique MSV-solution which satisfies the conditions for mean-square stability is
also E-Stable.
Proof The proof follows as such.
Corollary 1 identifies the conditions necessary for a unique MSS solution that is the MSVsolution.
Since the necessary and sufficient conditions for MSS imply bounded stability in the sense
of an RDE. It follows then, that a MSS solution is an RDE and thus satisfies the CLDC. The
remainder of the proof then comes from Lemmas 2 and 3.
QED∎
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Since the CLDC holds under MSS-solutions, a MSS-solution is E-stable. Proposition 1 is the main
result of this paper. By linking the methodology found in MSS economists can move forward from
rational expectation model to ones which include adaptive learning.
Both lemmas 2 and 3 come from Branch et al. to show the existence of an E-stable
solution.

They succinctly make the connection between the MSV-solution and the regime

dependent equilibrium through the CLDC.
CAGAN MODEL IN AN OPEN ECONOMY
In order to further understand the underlying economic ideas guiding a stable forward
solution, I present an economic application: a small open economy model.
Exchange market pressure models [EMP] employ a non-linear Markov switching
parameters, similar to the Cagan model presented earlier. Kumah (2011) argue that EMP models
have been proven to be empirically better than more traditional VAR models when exploring
exchange rate differentials. This result is important because we can analyze the active versus
passive reaction of the monetary authority when there is excess supply or demand of the currency.
This section explores the EMP model and how stability occurs when mean-square stability
conditions are introduced. I begin with the linear, expectational difference equation
•

where

=(

+

∗)

+ 6 − 7(2 ∗ +

Δ

)+™ ,

, is the income elasticity of money, 7 is the interest semi-elasticity of money, and the

shock term ™ is an i.i.d. term representing unanticipated money demand shock. Furthermore,

∗

represents foreign prices and 2 ∗ is the foreign interest rate. It is the standard assumption in this

model that both the UIP and PPP conditions hold.

Domestic money supply can be expressed additively as the combination of the domestic
credit and foreign reserves,

=I + .
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The monetary authority intervenes by selling and purchasing foreign exchange according to the
rule,

Δ

= −š($ )Δ .

At this point, the monetary authority’s decision creates a non-linearity in the model since their
sensitivity parameter, š, is dependent on the state (regime), $ . Under this general framework,

one could assume two possible monetary policy regimes: active and passive. The question now
becomes, given standard values for the remaining parameters, what combinations of active and
passive policy are supported by mean-square stability? The answer to this question allows
researchers to compare the theoretical range of stable values to those that empirically estimate
the sensitivity of the central banks. Ultimately, one could conclude whether or not a central bank
was working toward stability.
After substituting in the domestic money supply and the monetary authority’s intervention,
while taking the first difference, we find that
Δ

=

1
(−Δ
1 + 7 + š($ )

∗

− Δ6 + 7Δ2 ∗ + 7 Δ

− Δ™ + ΔI ).

From this form of the model we can conclude that the exchange rate dynamics are consistent with
theoretical literature.5 Furthermore it becomes apparent that the monetary policy parameter is
very important for the determination of the exchange rate. For instance, as

lim

œ(% )→±W

Δ

= 0, the

monetary authority would be holding the exchange rates fixed. Moreover, as š($ ) → 0, the
exchange rate is allowed to freely float given changes in economic fundamentals. Intermediate

policy can be summarized in a simple expression, that is when 0 < š($ ) < ∞. In this case, the
monetary authority mitigates appreciations (depreciations) by purchasing (selling) foreign
exchange.

When the central bank chooses −(1 + 7) < š($ ) < 0 or š($ ) < −(1 + 7)

monetary authority is either magnifying exchange rate changes or leaning against the wind.

5

See Dornbusch 1976.

the
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To simplify the model I assume that foreign prices, domestic output and foreign interest

rates remain constant, Δ

∗

= Δ6 = Δ2 ∗ = 0. The model further reduces to the non-linear, Markov-

switching regime form developed earlier,

Δ

=

1
(7 Δ
1 + 7 + š($ )

− Δ™ + ΔI ).

DETERMINACY UNDER CAGAN MODEL
By first assuming the interest semi-elasticity of money to be one and that the central bank
has a regime probability matrix defined as
,-

.8
=Ÿ
.1

.2
¢,
.9

For a specific parameterization, I find the region of determinacy and indeterminacy below in Figure
1. Using the economic intuition derived about š($ ), the parameter region is bound by the domain

[-2,18] and range [-2,14]. By choosing this set of values, I allow for all possible responses from
the central bank. It should be noted, that as the space increases, so does the determinacy region.
Upon inspection of Figure 1, it becomes clear that the forward solution only exists when
the monetary authority follows an intermediate policy for both active and passive policy. Leaning
against the wind and magnification of exchange rate changes are not considered stable solutions
under mean-square stability conditions.

Moreover, even a small intermediate response, in

magnitude, is not enough to keep the forward solution for the exchange rate stable. One can infer
then that even an aggressive active approach needs to be met with a somewhat large passive
approach. This can be attributed to agents expecting the possibility of regime change.
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}

Furthermore, recall that according to theorem 2, stability conditions are met when

• +Ψ…⊗… .

< 1, and

}

• +Ψ†⊗† .

< 1, that is when the fundamental solution exists when the non-

fundamental solution does not. Given the parameterization where š(1) = 2 J9I š(2) = 1.5, I find
that

}

• +Ψ…⊗… .

= 0 J9I

}

• +Ψ†⊗† .

= 0.07,

which indicates that the forward solution exists without a bubble solution thus rendering this
Markov-switching regime as stable.
EMPIRICAL TEST OF DETERMINACY
In order to test the stability of the model empirically, I analyze exchange rate data between
the US, Germany, and Japan from the late 1970’s through to the early 1990’s. Using the Plaza
and Louvre accords as natural regime changes in exchange rate policy, I am able to use the
monetary policy equation presented in the hyperinflation model in order to estimate the sensitivity
of the central bank to changing exchange rates. The regression that I estimate is below:
Δ = −šΔ .
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For this empirical work, I turn to the FRED database maintained by the Federal Reserve
of St. Louis. The three time-series data sets I employ are the: German Deutsche Mark to U.S.
Dollar exchange rate, Japanese Yen to U.S. Dollar Exchange rate, and the Federal Reserve’s
holdings of Japanese Yen. The final data set was procured from the Bundesbank, which captures
Germany’s central bank holdings of U.S. dollars. Daily exchange rates were averaged to obtain
monthly figures, while all data were not seasonally adjusted. Lastly, the regression was run with
the constant term restricted to be zero.
The regime changes in monetary and exchange rate policy during the Louvre and Plaza
accords, offered a natural experiment for testing the stability of each countries’ currency market
interventions. Empirical support shows that this time period of U.S. monetary policy exhibited at
least one structural break during 1985, which coincides economically with the signing of the
accords from these three countries. The regression results are displayed in Table 1 below.
Pre-Plaza accord
Using roughly nine years of monthly data prior to the signing of the Plaza accord, I find
that as the exchange rate appreciates, the central bank responded with an increase in foreign
reserves. A 1% appreciation in the exchange rate, i.e. the U.S. dollar (USD) appreciating relative
the Yen, results in a significant decrease of 2.8% of Yen held by the Federal Reserve. By
supplying more Yen and removing USD from circulation, the Fed was exacerbating the problem
of currency appreciation.
From the perspective of Germany, the period of time before the Plaza accord was signed,
the Bundesbank had been decreasing their holdings of U.S. dollars by 0.75% when experiencing
a depreciation of the DEM relative to the USD, a significant reduction. During this time, the USD
had been appreciating against both the Yen and the Deutsche Mark (DEM), which makes the
actions taken by the monetary authority of Germany plausible.
Unfortunately, the currency market does not work bilaterally and a simple open economy
model obviously does not include the complexity of each countries monetary policy, therefore I
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do not find it fruitful to make comparison between the magnitudes of responses from each country.
What I can observe though is the general reaction from each country and how monetary policy
changes affected the stability of the model.
Plaza accord
After the plaza accord was signed, the countries of the US, UK, Japan, France, and West
Germany agreed to depreciate the dollar relative to the yen and Deutsche Mark by intervening in
the currency market., thus began the Federal Reserve’s policy of USD depreciation. As less Yen
and more dollars become available the interest rates rises and falls respectively for each country.
This results in a shift of investment from the United States to Japan as agents looking to loan
money seek the higher interest rate. This floods the market with dollars and appreciates the yen
while depreciating the dollar.
As expected, the direction of the sensitivity parameter now reveals that monetary policy
was depreciating the USD. Reserves of the Yen increased significantly by 1.9% as the exchange
rate appreciated by 1%. This implies an aggressive strategy to change the level of foreign
reserves. Intuitively, the planned intervention into the currency market would signal a regime
change in the monetary policy rule.
Germany continued their monetary policy by decreasing their holding of USD as DEM
appreciated against the USD. Although, their exchange rate sensitivity isn’t significantly different
from zero it signals a strategy by the Bundesbank to allow their exchange rate to float freely. It
seems that the Bundesbank might have been relinquishing some control of the exchange rate
and the currency market and allowing the policy of the Federal Reserve to regulate the market.
Louvre accord and beyond
Given the overwhelming success of the Plaza accord, the same nations agreed to now
appreciate the dollar by signing the Louvre accord.

Again the nations would intervene

strategically in the currency market to appreciate the dollar against the Yen and Deutsche Mark.
We would expect that the direction of the Federal Reserve’s policy parameter to switch, signaling
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a change in policy to appreciate the dollar. This is exactly what I find. The change in exchange
rate parameter for the United States switches from negative to positive while the magnitude
increases greatly and remains significant. This particular intensity of intervention was followed
for approximately 18 months. In the months and years after the Louvre accord, the Federal
Reserve’s policy toward appreciating the dollar continued but not at a rate significantly different
from zero.
During the Louvre accord, the Bundesbank responded to increases of the exchange rate
by increasing their reserve of USD by a significant 1.01%. By increasing their reserves of USD,
the Bundesbank actively participated in appreciating the USD. In the time after the Louvre accord,
the Bundesbank continued their acquisition of the USD to appreciate the USD against the DEM.
The sensitivity of the exchange rate decreased to 0.35 when the exchange rate appreciated by
1%, still a significant amount.

n
R-Squared

š

Table 1. The Bundesbank’s Holdings of USD
Pre-Plaza
Plaza Accord
Louvre Accord
Accord
-0.749**
-.0282
-1.071*
(0.165)
(0.416)
(0.499)
176
17
17
0.10
0.03
0.22

Post-Louvre
Accord
-0.345*
(0.160)
125
0.04

Note: Regressions were run with a suppressed constant term. * refers to estimates being significant at the 95%
confidence level, while ** refers to significance at the 99% confidence level. Furthermore, robust standard errors were
created but revealed no qualitative difference from the reported coefficients.

n
R-Squared

š

Table 2. The Federal Reserve’s Holdings of YEN
Pre-Plaza
Plaza Accord
Louvre Accord
Accord
2.837*
-1.922**
7.574*
(1.367)
(0.614)
(3.421)
83
17
17
0.05
0.38
0.23

Post-Louvre
Accord
1.18
(0.769)
113
0.02

Note: Regressions were run with a suppressed constant term. * refers to estimates being significant at the 95%
confidence level, while ** refers to significance at the 99% confidence level. Furthermore, robust standard errors were
created but revealed no qualitative difference from the reported coefficients.
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Stability Results
Using the necessary and sufficient conditions of mean-square stability, I analyze each
regime change to determine whether the monetary policy was stable during the change.

Condition for stability:

}

• +Ψ…⊗… .

< 1, and

}

• +Ψ†⊗† .

<1

Table 3. Regime changes for the Federal Reserve
Pre-Plaza to
Plaza to Louvre Louvre to PostPlaza Accord
Accord
Louvre Accord
}
0
0
0
• +Ψ…⊗… .
}
147.92*
131.49*
0.09
+Ψ
.
•
†⊗†

Note: * refers to non-stable monetary policy during regime switches

By applying the same parameterization as earlier, it becomes clear that the exchange rate policy
instituted by the Federal Reserve was only stable after the intervention ended in the Post-Louvre
accord era.
Table 4. Regime changes for the Bundesbank
Pre-Plaza to
Plaza to Louvre Louvre to PostPlaza Accord
Accord
Louvre Accord
}
0
0
0
+Ψ
.
•
…⊗…
}
0.52
1.05*
0.94
• +Ψ†⊗† .

Note: * refers to non-stable monetary policy during regime switches

As for the regime positions of the Bundesbank, only during the Plaza to Louvre accord
was the exchange rate policy not stable. Corroborating the evidence found in the stability results
for the Federal Reserve, that the monetary policy during the Plaza accord was not sustainable.
CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION
In this paper, I am able to advance the literature on non-linear, regime shifting models by
studying the mean-square stability condition that also apply to the stability under adaptive
learning. As defined by Branch et al., satisfying the mean-square stability conditions ensures the
existence of a unique regime dependent equilibria. In turn this further indicates that this system
is E-Stable under adaptive learning. This finding is the central tenant of this paper. The link
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derived between mean-square stability and E-Stability is important since the only previous
attempts to find regime stable conditions fails to create tractable outcomes. As a result of this
research, economists are now able to include the concept of bounded rationality even in the face
of noisy regime feedback.
This paper looks at one application of the work, a univariate exchange rate model inspired
by the work of Cagan. I find two main results. The first is that only intermediate active and passive
responses by the monetary authority are found to be stable. The second finding is that the starting
parameterization matters. From the first result, I conclude that given the possibility of regime
switching, central banks no longer have the possibility of leaning against the wind or amplifying
the change in the exchange rate. From the second, it is clear that the many combinations of
parameters exist which can induce three outcomes: determinate, indeterminacy due to the
existence of bubble solution, and no solution.
By testing the hyperinflation model empirically, using data that spans the 1970’s-1990’s, I
am able to estimate and test the stability of the coefficients during each regime. What I find is
that the response of the Federal Reserve to changing exchange rates dominated that of the
Bundesbank in Germany. Moreover, the regime changes during that time produces unstable
model dynamics and were only corrected when active intervention into the currency markets
began to wane in the early part of the 1990’s. Further testing of participating countries, like Japan,
could reveal an outcome which helps explains their economic hardships during the 1990’s.
Further research would be necessary in order to incorporate the possibility of a twocountry, Markov-switching regime. Since the theoretical framework presented in this paper is
valid in a multivariate framework a new-Keynesian model could explore the interaction between
monetary authorities as they pass between active and passive regimes in order to both
manipulate the exchange rate.
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CHAPTER 2 “CONVERGENCE AND E-STABILITY OF A REGIME SWITCHING MONETARY
MODEL OF EXCHANGE RATE”
INTRODUCTION
Predicting exchange rate values was recently resurrected beginning with Nelson Mark
(1995) when he showed that model predictions of the exchange rate can outperform random walk
forecasts. This seminal work paved the way for future research into the forecasting of exchange
rates through a variety of macro-econometric models. This paper builds upon more recent
literature in adaptive learning in order to understand the responses by economic agents to specific
regime changes in monetary fundamentals. Unlike rational expectations, agents in the model are
assumed to know certain parameter values and the underlying model construction but are
required to estimate certain deep parameters, which govern convergence and stability.

By

assuming that agents are bounded in their rationality, this body of literature is able to incorporate
misspecification, sub-optimal decision making, and systematic errors into the confines of
traditional rational expectations analysis.6 One of the key criticisms of rational expectations
models of exchange rate determination has been the systemic under-prediction of the volatility in
exchange rate movements by economic fundamentals.

This paper aims to reevaluate the

volatility produced by exchange rate movements under the assumption that agents use an
adaptive learning approach to understand state dependent parameters. Moreover, this paper
highlights the slow convergence to a rational expectations outcome which accompanies the
empirical data. I am able to show that the convergence of the learned parameter to rational
expectations was slower during periods after a regime change, thus creating an economic climate
of policy uncertainty during the mid-1980’s in the United States.
During the 1980’s, the exchange rate between the United States and some of its global
partners, especially West Germany and Japan, experienced a high rate of appreciation. Due in
part to tightening monetary policy by Paul Volker’s Federal Reserve, U.S. dollars (USD) became

6

For a more extensive list regarding the qualitative comparisons between adaptive learning and rational
expectations, I refer readers to Evans and Honkapohja (2001).
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increasingly attractive. Between 1980 and 1983, the exchange rate appreciated by approximately
42%, in real terms, relative to an indexed global currency, and another 20% from 1984 to 1985
(Feldstein 1994). In order to disrupt this appreciation, the United States, Great Britain, West
Germany, Japan, and France developed a currency market intervention schedule to begin
depreciating the USD against their national currencies. This intervention, known as the Plaza
accord, marked a specific policy regime change which was followed 17 months later by the Louvre
accord. This follow up to the Plaza accord began a period of appreciating the USD against the
other currencies. The policy was needed as the USD depreciation was approximately equal in
magnitude to the sharp appreciation. The Louvre accord was positioned as a stabilization policy
targeted to bring the exchange rate back in line with historic and competitive levels. This period
from 1987 to 1990 marked a volatile yet trend stationary period in the exchange rate. Following
this second market intervention the exchange rate was relatively allowed to free float against the
remaining currencies. This paper explores the possibility that the appreciation leading up to the
Plaza accord and the subsequent currency market intervention created an exchange rate
adjustment which overshot its target due in part to the bounded rationality of economic agents.
In the figure below, the drastic influence in the currency market can be seen as the Federal
Reserve began to increase their holding of the YEN around the time of the Plaza accord and then
feverishly unload YEN during the Louvre accord, to then finally accumulate YEN again as the
exchange rate continued to depreciate.

32

This paper also addresses the exchange rate bubble which was observed between 1983
and 1984 and subsequently began to burst in February 1985, depreciating by 13% before the
Plaza meetings in September of the same year. Because of the gap in policy, many economists
argued that exchange rate interventions had little to no effect on the actual fluctuations of the
dollar and was instead dependent upon by the private market with little influence from the
government at all (Feldstein 1986). Frankel, Bergsten, and Mussa (1994) provide an alternative
rationale for the connection. The perception among market participants was that key monetary
policy decision makers were more adamant at bringing down the appreciating exchange rate than
were their predecessors. This led investors to anticipate the depreciation and thus sell their
dollars today to insulate themselves from future losses.

Under this assumption, agents

expectations played a significant role in the in the depreciation of the exchange rate, even more
so than actual policy. This can be seen in the second rationale presented by Frankel, et al. During
the first quarter of 1985, the United States engaged in $659 million of currency market intervention
with the Bundesbank of Germany and other nations selling approximately $10 billion in the foreign
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exchange market.7 Given these interpretations of the bubble and the collapse before the Plaza
accord, it appears that expectations played a significant role in the fluctuation of the exchange
rate. Under rational expectations, agents should have full knowledge of the model structure and
each policy parameter but because of exchange rate instability the assumption of rational
expectations appears to be too strict. Even during times of stable policy, economists would be
required to estimate parameter values econometrically. On the other hand, adaptive learning
allows economic agents to face some limitation on the true knowledge of the economic climate.
Adaptive learning will allow agents to assume the functional, reduced form of the model but will
need to learn the parameter values through some method of least squares learning.

By moving

away from the rational expectations hypothesis and thus loosening the assumptions on
expectations, this research provides evidence for the rationales presented by Frankel, et al.
considering the market participants during the 1980’s would not have known the direction and
magnitude of the policy parameters.
In order to explore this possibility, this paper draws on the conclusions of Kim (2008)
regarding the use of adaptive learning in monetary models of exchange rates. Kim finds that the
use of adaptive learning in comparison to rational expectations and adaptive expectations
dominates the forecasting of exchange rates over long time horizons.

Furthermore, in his

simulations, the use of bounded rationality accounts for the presence of exchange rate volatility
above what is found within the monetary fundamentals. Moreover, it appears that the inclusions
of adaptive learning also helps to explain the persistent deviations of the exchange rate away
from the monetary fundamentals. Although Kim begins to posit the outcome of exchange rate
behavior during regime switching, the analysis relies on the econometric analysis of two different
regime periods or cohorts of data instead of focusing on agents learning the regime change
through some updating algorithm. The lack of formal Markov switching dynamics leaves the

7
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model unprepared for handling the complicated relationship which competing regimes present.
This paper builds on the foundation set by Kim but includes the appropriate regime dynamics
present in earlier papers by Reed (2014) and Branch, Davig and McGough (2013).
These competing regimes present specific spillover effects which have been documented
in Markov-switching rational expectations models (MSRE). Specifically the model framework
presented by Farmer, Waggoner, and Zha (2011), focuses on the ability of their model to produce
an indeterminate solution even though the required stability conditions were met.

They

recognized the importance of regime spillover and its ability to conquer traditional determinacy
analysis. Furthermore, Ellison, Sarno, and Vilmunen (2007) attempt to explore this very idea by
constructing a model which allows competing central banks to exploit the exchange rate regime
by introducing Baysian learning.

Though their treatment of exchange rates as exogenous

processes, uninfluenced by monetary policy, rendered their work inadequate for future
consideration. In a previous research, I explored new convergence criteria for adaptive learning
models under the assumption of regime switching parameters. Unlike the research of Branch,
Davig, and McGough which focuses on recalculated stability conditions founded in the work of
Blanchard and Kahn (1980), my exploration follows the use of Mean-Square Stability to imply
expectational stability in bounded rationality. I was able to construct tangible, succinct conditions
to identify e-stability in MSV solutions. Empirically, I was able to associate the regime changes
of the Federal Reserve as not e-stable, essentially showing that economic agents would not have
learned the rational expectations outcomes during the currency interventions of the Plaza and
Louvre accords.
The paper continues by developing the monetary model of state-dependent exchange
rates under adaptive learning in the next section. Section 3 explore the monetary model using
adaptive learning whilst comparing the theoretical results to the rational expectations solution.
The last sections explores the exchange regime changes during the 1980s by outlining statistical
occurrences during each regime change. Moreover, I present an analysis of convergence to e-
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stability under mean-square stability when a monetary shock is present. Concluding remarks are
found in the final section.
MONETARY MODEL OF EXCHANGE RATES
Considering there are many iterations of the monetary model of exchange rates, I focus
on a form with clearly defined monetary policy parameters. Similar to the monetary models of
Frenkel (1976), Mussa (1976), and Kim (2008), Kumah (2008) supposes the connection of
exchange rates through purchasing power parity (PPP) as well as uncovered interest parity (UIP).
Let real money balances be defined as

•

where (

−

•

−

= 6 − 72 + ™

(1)

), real money balances, is a log-linear function of income 6 , domestic interest

rates 2 , and an unanticipated domestic money shock ™ . Thus,
elasticity of money, and 7 is the interest semi-elasticity of money.
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is defined to be the income
) = 2 − 2 ∗, holds Eq. (1)
(2)

is defined to be the log foreign price, $ is the nominal exchange rate defined as the

domestic price of foreign currency, and 2 ∗ is the foreign interest rate. The expectations operator,
∗

, denotes time t expectations of the t+1 change in nominal exchange rates under adaptive

learning. The domestic money supply is defined to be the linear combination of domestic credit
and foreign reserves.
supply,

Assuming a multiplier of unity Eq. (3) represents the domestic money
=I +

(3).

In his analysis Kim disregards the monetary authority and the possibility of policy regime
changes by failing to include an exchange rate policy parameter. Eq. (4) defines the relationship
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of the domestic monetary authority and their ability to intervene. The Federal Reserve in this
instance would intervene in the market for foreign exchange in accordance to the policy rule
Δ

= −šΔ$

(4)

where š is the exchange rate sensitivity parameter. Policy would dictate selling foreign

exchange as the exchange rate depreciates and purchasing as the exchange rate appreciates.

In order to create the state contingent parameter, I employ a Markov process where l is only a
three state Markov process where l evolves according to the transition matrix,

where & = +
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being the probability that l = 3 given that l
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= 1, /0 JUU 3 = 1, 2, 3.

= 2 and that

The characteristics of the transition matrix are taken to be recurrent and aperiodic implying a
unique stationary distribution. Eq. (4) now becomes,
Δ

= −š(l )Δ$ .

(5)

The monetary authority can choose between three different policy options: to actively appreciate,
depreciate or to allow a free-floating exchange rate. Under this framework, as the exchange rate
is depreciating, that is, the change in Δ$ is positive, the monetary authority can aid in the

depreciation.

This would require the degree of intervention to also be positive so that an

interventionist central bank would be selling foreign reserve. On the other hand, if there appears

to be pressure from appreciating exchange rates, that is, the change in Δ$ is negative, the
monetary authority could aid in the appreciation by purchasing foreign reserve, requiring the

degree of intervention to be negative. Lastly, if the degree of intervention is zero, then the
monetary authority has chosen a free-floating exchange rate and there would be no foreign
currency intervention. Empirically, during the Plaza and Louvre accords there was no pure free-
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floating exchange rates rendering the last state implausible during the time, but in the pre-plaza
and post-Louvre accords this regime is probable. Figure 2 below shows a timeline of each
currency market intervention.

In order to rewrite the monetary model in a more appealing form, I first take the first
difference of Eq. (2) and (3), so that money demand and supply now become,
Δ

•

= (Δ$ + Δ ∗ ) + Δ6 − 7(Δ2 ∗ +
Δ

= ΔI + Δ

∗ (Δ$

) + Δ$ ) + Δ™

(6)
(7).

To satisfy the e-stability conditions set forth by Evans and Honkapohja (2001) and the meansquare stability conditions created by Reed (2014), Eq. (6) and Eq. (7) can be rewritten as,
Δ$ = Π(l )(7Δ2 ∗ − Δ
where Π(l ) =

+

∗

− Δ6 + ΔI − Δ™ ) + Π(l )7

∗

Δ$

(8)

¨ œ(© ).

. The equilibrium exchange rate is now expressed as a function of the

fundamentals and the monetary policy parameter. This framework is comparable to the approach
created by Kim (2008), Evans and Chakraborty (2008), and Chakraborty (2009) where they
express the log nominal exchange rate as a function of the fundamentals and forward spot
exchange rate. Although these studies aim to explore the forward premium puzzle, it is important
to note that they fail to account for changing policy decisions with state dependent parameter
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values. This analysis creates a bridge between Markov-switching regime changes and the
forward premium puzzle and will be valuable for future work.
Furthermore, Eq. (8) follows the same intuitive understanding as classical models from
Dornbusch (1976) and Branson and Henderson (1985). We can observe that foreign price and
domestic output increases lead to appreciation of the domestic currency, as well as, positive
domestic money supply shocks which increase the domestic interest rate. On the other hand,
increases in foreign interest rates and increases in domestic credit lead to depreciating domestic
currency. Expansionary monetary policy shocks will also lead to a depreciation in the exchange
rate by lowing the domestic interest rate.
The policy parameter becomes an important component of the model dynamics and
ultimately governs the asymptotic convergence to the rational expectations solution. The range
of values for the exchange rate parameter can be anchored by free-floating intervention š($ ) =
0, where policy is absent, and by holding exchange rates fixed,

lim

œ(% )→±W

Δ

= 0. Intuitively,

intermediate policy can be explained then by having 0 < š($ ) < ∞. Kumah proposes that policy

values which follow −(1 + 7) < š($ ) < 0 represent a magnification of the changing exchange

rate.

On the other hand, when š($ ) < −(1 + 7) exchange rate policy is assumed to be

aggressively leaning against the wind. To summarize the proposed policy regimes, assuming a
multi-lateral relationship where countries coordinate with an agreed upon strategy and not
unilaterally in competition with foreign central banks,
š /0 l = 1, I
š($ ) = ªš) /0 l = 2, J
χ¥ /0 l = 3,

«2J`209
$$N
«2J`209
$$N .
90 29` ™ 9`209

To simplify the analysis and to model the exchange rate climate during the 1980’s, I assume that
state l = 3 is not an active policy state but a plausible state nonetheless. An alternative

assumption which I explore in further research would be for central banks to work in unison or to
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exploit the information spillovers created by both central banks to use the exchange rate for their
advantage. This is the policy approach taken by Ellison, Sarno, and Vilmunen (2007).
The idea of regime spillovers creating the possibility of competing regimes highlights an
important concept expressed by Farmer, Waggoner and Zha. That is, indeterminacy can develop
in seemingly stable models due to the linearization of the non-linear model and the multiplicative
interaction of the regimes. Linearizing Eq. (8) produces a system of equations which include the
state dependent parameters and the transitional probabilities for the M-state Markov regime,
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as expressed by Reed and Branch, Davig and McGough the system can be rewritten in a reduced
form, forward looking, expectational difference equation:
® = Π̄Ηt + Π Δ$
®
Δ$

(9),

where Ηt is the vector of fundamentals and Π = (⊕<
-C 7- )(&⨂EF ) and the coefficient matrix Π is

governed by ⊕<
-C 7- = I2JK(7 , 7) , … , 7< ).

This result is important as it is the foundation for the mean-square stability conditions set
forth in the following sections. Moreover, this form is ideal for purely forward looking expectational
difference equations which use adaptive learning. In the next section, by using Eq. (9), I outline
the basic features of adaptive learning and introduce the recursive least squares learning
algorithm.
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ADAPTIVE LEARNING, RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS, AND MSS
The framework for adaptive learning and the conditions which govern e-stability, i.e. the
convergence of a learning outcome to rational expectations, have been extensively written upon
with Evans and Honkapohja (2001) writing the most extensive survey of the literature. In a recent
update to the literature Branch, Davig, and McGough look at the stability conditions which govern
Markov switching regimes and subsequently produce results which are neither conclusive nor
tractable. Yet, their foundation proved to be beneficial as it laid the work for using new techniques
to ensure convergence to an e-stable outcome. Before the incorporation of adaptive learning and
mean-square stability, the general framework for adaptive learning is briefly outlined in this
section.
Bounded rationality can be introduced into the model by allowing market participants to
only know the general framework of the model but do not know the policy parameter values.
Agents will have to learn the values of the parameters by updating their estimates with new
information as well incorporating their previous miscalculations. Agents begin by creating a
perceived law of motions (PLM) where parameter values are not known but are estimated at time
t using a learning algorithm,
=o+q
∗

6

J9I

=o

+q

‡ .

The PLM has a unique feature built into its design as it is also the Minimum State Variable solution
(MSV). McCallum (1983) first identified this solution design, which was then expanded by Evans
and Honkaphoja in the context of adaptive learning and finally by Farmer, Waggoner, and Zha
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(2011) in a Markov switching model. The idea of the MSV is that there exists no smaller set of
linear dependent variables which provides a solution.8
Agents use their PLM and the information available to them, up to and including time t-1,
in order to update the actual law of motions (ALM) when the parameters are realized in time t+1.
Adaptive learning represents the ALM by substituting the PLM into the realized transition of the
endogenous variables,

6 = ?o

+ (?q

‡ + A) .

Over time, the learning process continues in a similar format until either the parameter values
diverge from the rational expectations outcome or converges. Convergence under adaptive
learning is known as E-stability.9
Adaptive learning though requires more than positing values and then subsequently
updating the information but must take into account the error of the initial guess. As Kim states,
“a sensible strategy for market participants would be to estimate these parameters by linear least

squares which will lead to a consistent estimate.” Suppose Θ represents the actual parameter

estimates realized by a market participant, then let Θ̄ represents an agent’s estimates of the

parameters.

Furthermore, agents will update their estimates using a learning method like

recursive least squares (RLS) or constant gain learning (CG)10. Below I outline more rigorously
the general method for developing RLS.
From Eq. (9) let the change in the exchange rate be a function of the fundamentals process

Η and an error term so that

8

Δ$ = Η G

Θ

+8

²

For further work and proof of MSV solutions see Evans and Honkapohja (2001) pg. 176 and Farmer, Waggoner,
and Zha (2011)
9
Evans and Honkapohja (2001) have an extensive summary of the process of learning.
10
Constant gain learning requires agents to have an inherent updating parameter which orders the importance of the
historical information.
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After the realization of the parameters, agents run the regression of Δ$ = Η G
the ordinary least squares estimate of the coefficient, Θ̄:
Θ̄ = ³h Η,
,C

Η,G ´

h Η,
,C

Θ + A to obtain

Δ$, ,

where we further define that
1̀
µ = h Η,

Η,G

,C

so the recursive expression of the OLS estimator can be written as Eq. (10) and (11),

µ =µ

Θ̄ = Θ̄

+ (Η

+ µ¶ Η

ΗG

−µ

),

(Δ$ − Η G

(10)
Θt ).

(11)

The RLS formulation allows agents to use their forecast errors to proportionally adjust their
estimates moving forward, but ultimately become less systematic as market participants learn the
rational expectations equilibrium. Kim argues and I agree that this methodology appears to
coincide with strong empirical evidence that economic agents are able to learn parameter
estimates given a sufficient period of time even when agents initial parameter values of the
fundamental process are very different from the rational expectations equilibrium. Thus RLS and
learning depend heavily on the ability of the market agents to estimate close the RE parameter
value. Since convergence is not always guaranteed the next section explores the conditions for
e-stability.
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MEAN SQUARE STABILITY AND E-STABILITY
Now that agents are estimating parameter values using an adaptive learning algorithm,
the conditions of e-stability need to be briefly outlined. The coefficient matrix in Eq. (9), ultimately
governs the stability of the model. In a multivariate, constant parameter model, the eigenvalues
of the matrix must be less than one in modulus in order for e-stability to occur. These conditions,
developed by Blanchard and Kahn (1980), have been extensively researched in linear models
but under the state-dependent parameters additional conditions must be met to insure
convergence. Taken from Markov switching rational expectations (MSRE) literature Mean-square
stability (MSS) provides the foundation for the adaptive learning solution to converge to the
solution guided by rational expectations.
Considering that MSRE models are governed by non-linear changes in the parameter,
they exhibit properties which can contribute to the indeterminacy of the equilibrium outcome. The
first being that the errors are serially correlated over time and thus should be reflected in the
second moment matrix of the error term. Furthermore, solutions can be influenced by “sunspot”
equilibria thus further contributing to indeterminacy. As a result, forward looking regime switching
models can be represented by a fundamental and non-fundamental component. Lubik and
Schorfheide (2004) provide the necessary framework to represent a forward looking model into
the fundamental and non-fundamental components. If the Blanchard and Kahn conditions are
met, these sunspot solutions tend to be stationary but regime switching models can still violate
these conditions because of the spillover effects the regimes create. These spillover effects occur
because of the a priori assumption that shocks are small and bounded in the neighborhood of the
perfect foresight linear approximation. But the inherent nature of regime switching parameters
violates this assumption. As Farmer et al. indicate, shocks in regime switching models are
considered large when compared to perfect foresight model shocks since they move the state
variables into a different region of the state space.
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Because of its ability to include the first and second moments into the stability conditions,
mean-square stability is standard usage in MSRE models and is defined to be,

Definition 1 An 9 : 1 stochastic process 6 is mean square stable (MSS) if there exists an n x 1
vector 6 and an n x n matrix Q such that U2 ( X6 Y − 6) = 0F Z J9I U2 ( X6 6 ′Y − \) = 0F Z F.
→W

→W

Definition 2 An n-dimensional process 6 is bounded if there exists a real number N such that
‖6 ‖ < _, /0 JUU `.

where ‖∗‖ is a well-defined norm.
This condition is stronger than traditional stability conditions which only rely on bounded mean
analysis rather than imply the existence of the second moment matrix. It can be noted that there
are alternatives to MSS such as covariance stationarity or asymptotic covariance stationarity.
Both are slightly weaker conditions of MSS considering asymptotic covariance stationarity implies
MSS but not conversely.
From this definition, the coefficient matrix governing Eq. (8) must be rewritten in the
fundamental form proposed by Lubik and Schorfheide. That is, the
The stochastic process, Δ$

, is mean-square stable if and only if the spectral radius of the

} z⊗z is less than one. That is
linearized coefficient Ψ

}

• +Ψz⊗z .

< 1.

Adapting Theorem 1 to the MSRE models requires the fundamental solution have the same form
as stated above, again assuming the vector of shock terms is already mean-square stable. That
is : = Ω($ ):

+ Γ($ )l is mean square stable if and only if
}

< 1,

}

< 1.

• +Ψ…⊗… .

As for the non-fundamental component O = Λ($
stable if and only if

• +Ψ†⊗† .

, $ )O

+ Q($ )Q($ )G A , O is mean-square

Again, we assume the sunspot error term is white noise. Thus we get the following theorem.
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Theorem 2 The stochastic process, with both fundamental and non-fundamental components is
found to be uniquely determinate under mean-squared stability if and only if
}

• +Ψ†⊗† .

< 1.

}

• +Ψ…⊗… .

< 1, and

Proof. See Definition 1.
In previous research I present the link between MSS and e-stability, Reed (2014) by using
the MSV solution where I prove the following preposition11,
Proposition 1 A unique MSV-solution which satisfies the conditions for mean-square stability is
also E-Stable.
This connection will be the basis for the empirical work in the following sections. Since agents
will be assumed to follow a bounded sense of rationality, Proposition 1 will be required to analyze
the effects of a monetary policy shock.
The remainder of the paper extends the foundations of Kim’s simulation work by including
the realization that state dependent parameter should produce a result which is expectationaly
unstable. This result follows directly from the theoretical implications from the previous section
and the research created in Reed (2014). The next section begins by exploring the process of
simulating the exchange rate and the Federal Reserve’s exchange rate policy parameter.
ESTIMATION AND SIMULATION
Through this section I outline the estimation of and subsequent simulation of the Federal
Reserve’s policy parameter and exchange rate with Japan. For this analysis I assume that the
two countries are working bi-laterally to adjust the exchange rate. Although the Plaza and Louvre
accords were the joint effort of England, France, USA, Canada, Japan, and Italy, the assumption
of bi-lateral coordination is purely for the sake of simplicity. Furthermore, I examine how the
simulated data has the capability of both qualitatively and quantitatively representing the

11

For the full proof, please refer to Reed (2014)
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YEN/USD exchange rate in the absence of a regime change but fails to replicate the data when
introduced to different policy regimes.
Some descriptive statistics for the monthly exchange rate of the US dollar (USD), UK
pound (LBS), German deutschemark (DEM), Japanese Yen (YEN), and the Swiss franc (FRA)
are shown in the table below12.
The data are monthly observations from 1978:10 to 1998:12 and were obtained from the
St. Louis Federal Reserve FRED database. The exchange rates represent monthly averages of
the foreign currency to one U.S. dollar. The foreign reserves for each central bank represent the
monthly unilateral foreign currency holdings in domestic denominations.

Table 1. Exchange Rate Variance Ratios
YEN
DEM
SWISS POUND
mean
std.
dev
VR(1)
n=223

VR(8)
n=223

VR(16)
n=215

VR(20)
n=211

5.059

0.644

0.485

-0.512

0.328

0.213

0.208

0.153

1

1

1

1

1.844

1.94

1.774

1.793

2.304

2.578

2.156

1.931

2.156

2.526

2.055

1.78

note: The data are monthly observations from 1978:10 to 1998:12
and were obtained from the St. Louis Federal Reserve FRED
database. The variance ratio statistic, VR(k), is the variance of the
k-monthly change divded by k times the variance of the onemonth change.

Table 1 identifies the variance ratio statistic, VR(k) for the exchange rate of each national
currency to the USD. This statistic is created by finding the ratio of the k-month change to the k
times the ratio of the one-month change. Using the method pioneered by Lo and MacKinlay
(1988, 1999) each exchange rate series exhibits a variance ratio greater than unity and appears

12

Research indicates that exchange rates are not affected by seasonality thus all data has not been seasonally
adjusted.
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to increase as the time horizon increases and remain above unity. This behavior is indicative of
serial correlation in the exchange rate over time and mean diverting performance. If the variance
ratio statistic exhibited decreasing values and values below unity, as the time horizon increases,
one could assume mean reversion. Kim finds that over a similar time frame, the quarterly
exchange rate returns for the UK, Germany and Japan experience mean reverting behavior in the
long-run, an obvious departure from my findings. Furthermore, Figure 3 shows the YEN/USD
changes in conditional volatility during the regime changes with higher conditional volatility
following the plaza accord regime change.

The Louvre accord shows a decrease in the

conditional volatility until the policy expires where there is a marked increase in volatility, which
remains for the length of the sample period. Moreover, the adjustment of the conditional variance
happens slowly over 7 months during the first regime change where the variance during the
Louvre accord and post-louvre accord adjust more quickly, within a few months.

These findings begin to provide evidence for the hypothesis that regime changes during
the 1980s created excessive volatility. Furthermore the persistent long-run deviations from the
mean (periods greater than 17 periods apart) coupled with the statistically different regime
variances point to the possibility that agents are learning the regime changes slowly if at all.
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In order to make direct comparisons between studies, this paper assumes that the interest
semi-elasticity of money to be one and that the central bank’s regime probability matrix needs to
be estimated. In previous literature from Kim, the transition probability elements are provided ad
hoc instead of the elements being estimated using MSRE techniques.
Further parameterization of the model also requires the estimation of the monetary policy

parameter, š. Robust, OLS regression estimates for the Federal Reserve holdings of YEN during

each regime yielded results similar to the Markov-switching maximum likelihood estimation. Table
2 reports the results.

n
R-Squared

ML Estimate

š

Table 2. The Federal Reserve’s Holdings of YEN
Robust OLS estimates
Pre-Plaza
Plaza Accord
Louvre Accord
Accord
2.837*
-1.922**
7.574*
(1.367)
(0.614)
(3.421)
83
17
17
0.05
0.38
0.23

4.678
(0.00)

-22.615
(0.00)

5.661
(0.00)

Post-Louvre
Accord
1.18
(0.769)
113
0.02

5.661
(0.00)

Note: Regressions were run with a suppressed constant term. * refers to estimates being significant at the 95%
confidence level, while ** refers to significance at the 99% confidence level. For the MLE, three states were shown to
be the maximum number of reasonable states, with state 1 representing the floating exchange, state 2 representing
the Plaza accord, and state 3 the Louvre accord.

The robust OLS estimates provide an intuitive starting point for interpreting the Federal
Reserve’s exchange rate sensitivity parameter. The low R-Squared values for both the pre-Plaza
accord and the post-Louvre accord point to the free floating nature of the exchange rate once
policy intervention subsided. Moreover, the directions of the four coefficients match up the
theoretical interpretation of the model. The magnitudes, representing the elasticity, shows a very
elastic response to changes in exchange rates except for the post-Louvre accord period. Again,
this points to an absence of active policy and move back to a free-floating exchange rate.
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The Markov-switching maximum likelihood estimation corroborates the story being formed
by the OLS estimates. The directions for each state again correspond with the theoretical
implications of the model. Furthermore, the values of the pre-Louvre accord parameter are
quantitatively similar between estimation methods. Moreover, the transition to the deprecation
state indicates a more aggressive ML estimation of depreciation of the exchange rate than the
OLS provided. The magnitude of the MLE parameter estimate is also approximately an order
higher than that of the OLS. These similarities between estimates highlights one of the key
findings of this research.
REGIME CHANGE ESTIMATES

Again assuming that the number of states, l = 3, so that the non-linear system reduced to the
linear form of,
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regime changes can be used to estimate the Markov switching regimes. Thus, l can be thought

of as the floating exchange rate, l) is the Plaza accord, and l¥ would be Louvre accord.
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Figure 4 approximates the smoothed state probability estimates from the MLE parameter
estimates.

As expected the Markov-switching regime changes align perfectly with each

hypothesized regime change during the Louvre and Plaza accords. This finding is again an
encouraging outcome as it provides additional support for the validity of the MLE and OLS
estimates. Moreover, it becomes apparent that the pre-Plaza accord horizon was marked with
appreciating exchange rates, something that was expressed as the pre-plaza accord exchange
rate bubble. The underlying transition moves through Plaza accord but since the actual state was
not absorbing, then moves on to the Louvre accord and finally ends with the free floating exchange
rate. Table 3 below displays the estimated transition matrix. What is interesting about the
transition probabilities is that moving from state 2, the Plaza accord, to state 3, the free floating
exchange rate would be absorbing.

MEAN-SQUARE STABILITY
In order to include MSS into the model a researcher can choose one of two ways to build
state dependent parameters into the analysis. The first would be to run static learning parameter
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estimates using the known regime demarcations and then observe the parameter evolution when
a regime change occurs. This would effectively simulate the exchange rate dynamics in three
separate and distinct observations. Kim’s research relies upon this framework considering his estability conditions fail to allow for the spillover effects that each regime change creates.

The

second is to run a dynamic learning environment, which by linearizing the model builds into the
framework separate regime exchange rate variables. Again, this algorithm is preferred as it allows
for the regime spillover effects which are present throughout the estimation.
This apparent spillover can be seen in the failure of the Federal Reserve’s regime changes
to meet the MSS conditions. The results from Reed (2014) are displayed in Table 4 and show
that the policy changes that the Federal Reserve took during the Plaza and Louvre accords would
not have resulted in learning the rational expectations solution.
Condition for stability:

}

• +Ψ…⊗… .

< 1, and

}

• +Ψ†⊗† .

<1

Table 4. Regime changes for the Federal Reserve
Pre-Plaza to
Plaza to Louvre Louvre to PostPlaza Accord
Accord
Louvre Accord
}
0
0
0
• +Ψ…⊗… .
}
+Ψ
.
147.92*
131.49*
0.09
•
†⊗†
Note: * refers to non-stable monetary policy during regime switches

It is important to note that to move forward with simulating the learning environment one
must reconcile the timing of the agents’ information set. Generally when using timing mechanisms
an additional level of assumption may be needed, that is agents with information sets up to an
including t-1 are required to forecast non-observable variables. This could be accomplished with
agents using the Kalman filter to forecast time t variables in time t-1, but would require some
inherent knowledge as to which non-observable variables should be included in the forecast. This
added assumption deviates from the spirit of adaptive learning and what this paper is trying to
accomplish. Thus, to eliminate this assumption, VAR style learning can be used to recursively
express time t variables.
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Furthermore, I rely on arbitrarily fixed initial beliefs, as they are the simplest way of
initializing beliefs and intuitively seem to reflect an agents information set. This is done through
a subsample regression and then compared to a standardized identity variance-covariance
matrix.

This assumption is important as it doesn’t require that agents begin with rational

expectations beliefs. RE consistent beliefs would imply that the model was solved originally using
rational expectations parameters and the covariance matrix. This is a clear violation of bounded
rationality and as such, this analysis restricts initial believes to be arbitrarily fixed.
ADAPTIVE LEARNING
Before the inclusion of adaptive learning into the process, I first analyzed how well the
MSRE model simulated the real data.

In Figure 5 below, I find that the MSRE process,

parameterized per the findings above drastically overshoots the changing YEN/USD exchange
rate but seems to capture the qualitative structure of the actual series.

It will be shown that by including adaptive learning into the simulation, the actual data and the
simulated data are more consistent. This points toward the importance of adaptive learning in
the model.
In a recent paper regarding the use of adaptive learning in forward looking models,
Carceles-Poveda and Giannitsarou (2007) generate code which helps users explore the different
adaptive learning algorithms: recursive least squares (RLS), stochastic gradient (SG), and
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constant gain (CG). By modifying the language I am able to institute regime-switching parameters
and found that the agents were not able to learn the Federal Reserve’s policy parameter.
Therefore the learning solutions are not e-stable.

This is an important outcome since it

corroborates the outcome found previously when using MSS conditions. The remainder of this
section highlights key iterations of the learning solution using a various learning algorithms.
Solving for the rational expectations solution indicated that the parameter value to be
learned is

-0.3067. Moreover, considering that the parameter estimates do not yield a MSS

solution, the learned solution should not converge to the RE outcome over the course of the
estimation. I begin with the RLS solution by assuming that the shock vector is random with a
variance of one. I simulate the data over 250 periods; similar to the length of the exchange rate
series 231. The initial starting point for the RLS solution is assumed to be at the average
parameter estimate. Figure 6 below shows the RLS parameter estimate.
Figure 6. Federal Reserve Ex. Rate Sensitivity RLS and RE Parameter Estimates
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The RE solution corresponds to the Federal Reserve’s exchange rate sensitivity parameter being
estimated at -5.27 while the RLS estimation fluctuates between -5.84 and -5.39. It appears that
the estimates overshoot the RE solution at the beginning of the simulation where they never quite
recover and fail to converge. Moreover, it appears that estimates throughout the simulation
appear to overestimate the parameter value.

This result coincides with the idea that agents

would not have been able to learn the Federal Reserve’s policy parameter during the regime
switching.

Furthermore, additional simulations were conducted using a variety of learning

combinations with each estimation exhibiting similar results.
Figure 7 outlines the stochastic gradient simulation. The SG estimate again initially
overshoots the RE solution and begins to converge while oscillating around the RE solution. This
continues until just after the 100th month where then the estimate diverges and begins to fluctuate
with higher volatility. This divergence appears to correspond with the estimated and hypothesized
regime switches. Both the RLS-CG13, in Figure 8, and RLS-SG parameter estimates show severe
divergence from the RE solution and also appear to both exhibit some oscillation around the RE
solution. Regardless, the RLS-SG parameter estimate displays a very high degree of variation
which seems to compound as the simulation moves through the 150th period and intensifies at
the end of 250 time periods. Moreover, the RLS-CG estimate begins to converge after an initial
divergence but seems to again experience high degrees of variation when the regime switches
and finally explodes at the end of the estimation.

13

Its important to note that changes in the gain parameter exhibited no real difference in the learning outcome.
As a result I parameterize the algorithm with the value of 0.3, which is a widely accepted value in the learning
literature.
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Figure 7. Federal Reserve Ex. Rate Sensitivity RLS-SG and RE Parameter Estimates

Figure 8. Federal Reserve Ex. Rate Sensitivity RLS-CG and RE Parameter Estimates
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Figure 9 describes the simulated exchange rate returns series under adaptive learning.
The simulated returns are conditioned on starting in an appreciating exchange rate regime. This
is so the exchange rate climate in the simulation coincides with the actual experiences of the
exchange rate. Overall the simulated returns appear to overemphasize the depreciation of the
exchange rate throughout the horizon but show some indication of qualitative and quantitative
equivalence.

At the beginning of the simulation, AL appears to recreate the volatility and the

appreciation of the actual YEN/USD returns but then fails to closely approximate the returns after
the initial regime change occurs. The contributions of adaptive learning and state dependent
parameters again suggest that the excess volatility comes from these underlying model
assumptions. For the remainder of the time horizon the actual exchange rate series looks
qualitatively to the simulation. Again, this evidence corroborates the idea that Markov-switching
regime changes which feature adaptive learning are an ideal model in the presence of bounded
rationality.
Figure 9. Actual and Simulated Federal Reserve Ex. Rate Returns

CONCLUDING REMARKS
For this analysis, I employ a standard monetary model of exchange rates and attach to it
the features of adaptive learning and state-dependent parameters.

By governing the
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dependency, using a Markov-switching process, I am able to use the foundation of mean-square
stability in order to analyze the adaptive learning estimates. What I find is that economic agents
during the Plaza and Louvre accords would not have been able to learn the Federal Reserve’s
parameter decisions and thus create a climate of excess volatility in YEN/USD exchange rate
returns. This unique research is predicated on the idea that agents must be bounded in their
rationality, a hypothesis that macroeconomics has been slow to adopt.

This boundedness

provides an empirical hypothesis, different from modern macroeconomics, which believes that
agents truly incorporate misspecification, sub-optimal decision making, and systematic errors into
their decision processes.

Adaptive learning feels like an intuitive alternative to rational

expectations and appears to produce tangible results.
In order to link rational expectation to that of adaptive learning through e-stability, this
paper uses the necessary conditions of mean-square stability. Earlier work has shown that MSS
provides a stronger, tractable link to expectational stability, something Markov-switching adaptive
learning models had been previously missing.
The monetary model of exchange rates allows for a deeper analysis regarding the effects
adaptive learning and Markov-switching have on economic agents. Given the assumptions which
accompany these features, this paper finds greater volatility and slower convergence under
adaptive learning than found traditionally with rational expectations. Moreover, I find that agents
overestimate the depreciating effects of the Federal Reserve’s exchange rate policy parameter.
When compared to OLS estimates of approximately -2, agents using adaptive learning estimated
the elasticity to be -5, rendering them much more sensitive to the depreciating exchange rate.
Intuitively, this estimation may be a result of the drastic effects from the Plaza and an important
insight into how agents estimated future returns.
Although not a novel finding, this paper combines the use of adaptive learning and statedependent parameters in a way which is unique to the literature. Moreover, I find that adaptive
learning without a change in regimes does fairly well at modeling exchange rate returns but again
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overestimates returns once the initial regime changes. Furthermore, recursive least squares
proves to come closest in learning the rational expectation solution. Other algorithms like RLSCG and RLS-SG fail to produce any semblance of a RE solution with mostly divergent outcomes.
Again the intuition rests in the fact that once the regime has switched, agents are very slow to
react, often overshooting the actual value of the parameter.
Future policy decision would benefit from this research as it shows realistically how
economic agents absorb and use information. This would be valuable to a policy maker trying to
execute a specific economic policy as it could help to produce a more reliable outline as to how
agents react to forecasting future macroeconomic variables.
CHAPTER 3 “WHAT CAN MEAN-SQUARE STABILITY, ADAPTIVE LEARNING, AND
REGIME SWITCHING TELL US ABOUT THE FORWARD-PREMIUM PUZZLE”
INTRODUCTION
Since its initial treatment, the forward premium puzzle has been a longstanding paradox
within macroeconomic and finance research. The puzzle corresponds to the fact that empirically
the forward exchange rate is a poor predictor of the expected depreciation in the spot exchange
rate. Under rational expectations (RE), the OLS estimate is consistently underestimated in
magnitude and often is estimated to be negative. As stated by Chakraborty and Evans (2008),
the forward-premium puzzle is surrounded by additional stylized empirical results. The goodness-

of-fit measurement, µ ), of the forward-premium regression is generally low, while the estimate of

the forward premium is positively correlated. Chakraborty and Evans contend that econometric
learning plays a large part in the abolishment of these poor results. They find that learning not
only generates the forward-premium puzzle but also creates the stylized empirical results which
surround most attempts.
Additional motivations for explaining the forward premium puzzle can be split into two
camps: investor risk aversion and non-rational expectations.

Risk aversion in the foreign

exchange market incorporates the idea that investors need a risk premium to invest in a volatile
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asset to hedge against the risk. Although this offers an intuitive explanation, empirically this result
fails to explain the puzzle. Evans and Chakraborty turn to the second approach to motivate their
paper, non-rational expectations. Non-rational traders could potentially distort asset prices away
from fundamental values thus creating the low predicting power seen in ordinary least squares
regressions. First identified as a potential explanation by De Jong et al. (1990), Mark and Wu
(1998) show that noisy traders under certain assumptions mimic the empirical data.
Like Chakraborty and Evans, Kim (2009) insists that adaptive learning (AL) contributes to
the volatility experienced in the forward premium.

In traditional analysis of exchange rate

movements, RE fails to account for the volatility in economic fundamentals. Literature suggests
that deviations from rational expectations or the underlying assumptions of the model are required
for explaining the large volatility14. Moreover, what seems most puzzling is why RE fails to predict
exchange rate fundamentals over a short period while doing very well at predicting fundamentals
over long time horizons.
In recent years, researchers have attacked the assumption of rational expectations calling
into question the ability of an economic agent to perfectly estimate parameter values
econometrically. The idea of bounded rationality has grown into a substitutable assumption for
RE. In Kim’s paper, he suggests that adaptive learning is superior to RE for modeling the forward
premium puzzle. I build on his research by including a more rigorous approach to adaptive
learning by including the possibility of state dependent parameter values.

Furthermore, I

introduce mean-square stability as a necessary condition for assessing the economic agents’
learning process. This last addition allows for the very realistic possibility of regime switches
within monetary policy.
This paper is motivated by the latter idea, that non-rational agents are moving the
fundamental values away from rational expectations in the foreign exchange markets. This

14

See Meese and Singletom (1986), West (1987), MacDonald and Taylor (1994) and Shiller (1987)
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influence of bounded rationality can be expressed as the downward bias of the OLS regression
on the forward premium. This paper aims to replicate the results found in previous non-rational
expectations literature as well as provide additional motivation for the observed bias.
Furthermore, the literature suggests that the number of empirical observations have a strong
effect on the magnitude of the downward bias on the estimated parameters. Intuitively, this
influence is ingrained in the tradition of non-rational behavior. Economic agents participating in
the foreign exchange market rely on a specific information set in order to forecast future spot
exchange rates. As a regime change occurs, the observations cultivated to make forecasts
suddenly become less reliable. Having an adequate amount of information would help agents to
learn the rational expectations solution.
To test these assumptions empirically, this paper looks at recent interventions in the
foreign exchange market for possible regime changes. Over the course of three decades, there
have been isolated incidents of marked currency market intervention. Although the reality is that
most exchange rate series are susceptible to currency manipulation. Most recently, this past
January the Switzerland national bank made an unexpected decision to unpeg the Swiss Franc
from the Euro. What was once considered a very stable monetary environment quickly ushered
in a period of panic and uncertainty. Over the course of the announcement, the Swiss stock
market collapsed and hedge funds recorded big losses, as the exchange rate appreciated by
approximately 30%. So why did this happen? During the period of pegged exchange rate,
investors sought out cheaper Francs, ultimately appreciating the currency and putting
Switzerland’s export heavy economy in danger of faltering.15 Although this event contains a
specific demarcation in regimes it offers little in the way of continuous regime uncertainty. This
paper uses this empirical observation to understand the influence regime changes have on
bounded rationality.

15

On 1/15/15 the Switzerland National Bank (SNB) unpegged the Swiss Franc to the Euro Zone Euro. The
Economist provided the information and I refer readers to their coverage for more topical analysis.
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Furthermore, announced currency market interventions were observed during a
tumultuous time during the 1980’s in an effort to appreciate the German Deutsche Mark (DEM)
and the Japanese Yen (YEN) in response to the U.S. dollar (USD) appreciating aggressively.
Known as the Plaza and Louvre accords, multi-lateral currency intervention achieved the
significant depreciation of the USD against the DEM and YEN. In fact it worked so well, the
Louvre accord was established to stabilize the depreciation. The effects of which were felt long
after the final intervention in 1987-88.
In this paper I find that the inclusion of state-dependent parameters represents the
exchange rate fairly accurately. I am able to simulate the estimated coefficients found empirically
for the U.S., U.K., Japan, and Switzerland. Moreover, certain parameterizations achieve the
theoretical value of the premium coefficient from the projection of the exchange rate onto the
forward premium. These inclusions appear to better characterize exchange rate behavior over
the last few decades. That is, exchange rate fundamentals have likely been susceptible to
changes in underlying parameter values through various channels. Oil price shocks, regime
changes in monetary policy and monetary realignment all have impactful effects on exchange rate
processes.
CURRENT LITERATURE
In their recent paper, Evans and Chakarborty discuss the merits of adaptive learning and
how this deviation from rational expectations can help explain empirically slow convergence of
the forward premium to the rational expectations solution. They believe that agents rely on
learning, in the econometric sense, to form expectations regarding the forward exchange rate. It
is because of this deviation from rational expectations the authors have been able to show that
adaptive learning reproduces key empirical results in the data that is often attributed to irrationality
in the exchange markets. Evans and Chakraborty assume that agents use a rolling understanding
of parameter values to obtain expectations close to rational, assuming agents anticipate structural
changes. This paper is partially motivated by their exclusion of state-dependent parameters in
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an attempt to explain the downward bias in estimated forward-premium regression coefficient that
Fama (1984) first identified. They suggest that the foundation they constructed within the
monetary exchange-rate model can be beneficial for more elaborate models using perpetual
learning. Although, they suggest that extensions of their work should come from assumptions
regarding risk aversion, incomplete price adjustment, heterogeneous expectations and
incomplete information processing, I employ a state-dependent parameter model and explore the
convergence of expectations under mean-square stability.
Using the canonical monetary exchange-rate model, Kim furthers the literature by briefly
including state-dependent parameters under adaptive learning. Kim argues against the rational
expectations paradigm by noticing that the movements in the volatility of exchange rate data could
not be “justified by movements in economic fundamentals.” These assumptions though require
conditions for stability which appropriately account for the multiplicative nature of regime
switching. Kim fails to provide the correct stability analysis. Also, the method for employing the
regime change is limited to simulating the learning environment with a strict change in parameter
values instead of including the transition probabilities in the model. A recent paper presented by
Branch, Davig, and McGough (2013) provides convergence and stability conditions for Markov
switching adaptive learning models, but shown by Reed (2014) these conditions are not rigorous
nor tractable under these circumstances.
Moreover, empirically, rational expectations has proven time and time again to fail in its
ability to accurately predict exchange rate dynamics over the short run. Kim continues the
argument found in Reed (2014), as well as, Evans and Honkiphoja (2001) that rational
expectations appears to be too strong an assumption for exchange rate fundamentals.

In

practice, economists must estimate econometrically parameter values; so why do we assume
agents within the model are able to do the same? Adaptive learning allows for the possibility of
expectations to be near rational. Market participants should assumed to have some limited
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knowledge about the true economic structure and a plausible view of the parameter value which
needs to be estimated.
Kim, motivated by adaptive learning, again employs the monetary model that Evans and
Chakraborty use in order to show that the convergence to rational expectations is slow and that
adaptive learning is a plausible alternative to rational expectations. The results of Kim’s analysis
shows that adaptive learning provides insights into three main tenants. The first is that adaptive
learning appears to outperform rational expectations when predicting exchange rate returns over
long horizons. Secondly, Kim shows that adaptive learning can generate empirically similar
exchange rate volatility in excess of fundamentals volatility. Finally, it is shown that adaptive
learning is able to produce persistent deviations of the exchange rate from the fundamentals.
Intuitively, these last two outcomes reveal that agents slowly absorb new information and that
adaptive learning creates the possibility of slow convergence to rational expectations. This paper
aims to replicate the results found by Kim, Evans and Chakraborty, and Chakraborty in that the
convergence of the exchange rate estimated by adaptive learning to rational expectations is not
necessary guaranteed under mean-square stability and state-dependent parameters.
Furthermore, adaptive learning under Markov switching parameters provides an excellent
explanation of the forward premium puzzle.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the
monetary model used for exchange rate analysis which includes adaptive learning dynamics
along with state-dependent parameters. Section 3 reviews the stability conditions for e-stability
and explores more stylized facts regarding exchange rate. Moreover, I simulate the economy
under a set of parameterized values in order to compare the results from a Markov-switching
Adaptive Learning (MSAL) model to empirical observations. The final section contains concluding
remarks and observations.
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MONETARY MODEL
Under the rational expectations hypothesis, estimates of the forward spot exchange rate
should be forecasted by the forward rate and an expectational error. The coefficient on the
forward spot exchange rate should be one and under the REH, one would expect there to be no
serial correlation among the errors. Yet, empirically REH appears to fail on all accounts. Often,
researchers identify a severe downward bias associated with the estimated coefficient especially
during shorter time horizons while other researchers appear to identify significant serial correlation
among error terms.16
In light of the empirical evidence, researchers have called into question the validity of the
REH.

The forward premium puzzle may exists because of this violation, even under the

assumption that capital is perfectly mobile. Additionally, the literature suggests that failures in
econometric implementation can be an explanation for why the puzzle is present. This paper
approaches both criticisms in attempts to explain the puzzle by including an alternative to rational
expectations and a more robust set of econometric conditions which govern convergence and
stability.
Bounded rationality as an alternative to the REH, was brought to the attention of
macroeconomists by Sargent (1983) and formally presented by Evans and Honapohja. This
paper treats participating economic agents in a similar vein, allowing agents to know the functional
form of the model but do not know the parameter values which govern stability and learnability.
Agents must act through their perceived parameter values and update their estimates as new
information becomes available, essentially acting as applied econometricians. It is important to
note, that market participants fail to anticipate regime shifts and only ex-post observe the regime.
By assuming this, the transition matrix probabilities could be estimated econometrically through

16

Research shows that empirically, the estimate slope coefficient is negative, even when adjusted for covered
interest parity.
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adaptive learning but for simplicity, I will provide a parameterization consistent with exchange rate
behavior.
Unlike the assumptions provided by the REH, adaptive learning allows for the possibility of
multiple equilibria. Moreover, AL can provide insight into which equilibrium is e-stable, and
therefore coincides with the outcome found by RE. Also, by using the framework developed in
an earlier paper, I am able to better analyze the dynamics of a speculative bubble solution.
Empirically, the existence of a bubble would provide evidence against the assumption of RE,
considering the rational expectations framework believes an asset’s value should reflect only its
market fundamental value.

Adaptive learning on the other hand, doesn’t predispose this

assumption but allows for the existence of a bubble. Moreover, AL and e-stability can be used to
determine the learnability of multiple equilibria including that created from a bubble. Empirically,
during the first half of the 1980s Meese (1986) supported the idea that the appreciation of the US
Dollar (USD) in the currency market was due in part by a speculative bubble. The literature
regarding bubbles and the rational expectations hypothesis within the exchange rate dynamics
during this time are mixed. As reported by Wu (1995), exchange rate variability was found to be
both caused and not caused by speculative bubbles depending on the author and the
methodology.
Similar to the monetary models of Frenkel (1976) and Mussa (1976), I also introduces the
monetary model as an appropriate representation of the exchange rate dynamics. For the sake
of comparison, the monetary model first identifies the relationship between the exchange rate and
its fundamental value, thought of as the long-run value of the exchange rate. Equation (2.1)
depicts this difference,

· =/ −$ ,

(2.1)

where / represents the linear combination of relative money stock and real income between two

countries at time t. $ is considered the nominal exchange rate between a domestic and foreign
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country.17 Thus, · represents the log difference in time t exchange rates from its long-run
equilibrium value.

In order to evaluate the assumption of adaptive learning, equation (2.2) describes the kperiod forecast of the change in exchange rates regressed against the current deviation of the
exchange rate from its long-run fundamental value,
$

–

−$ =

–

+ 7– · + ˆ

–,

(2.2)

We would expect that under the rational expectations hypothesis, the regression coefficient from

a simple OLS regression 7– should equal 1. Moreover, the regression coefficient allows us to

compare the prediction power of short and long-run forecasts by analyzing the direction of 7– .
We can assume that as the exchange rate under performs against its long-run average, the slope

of the regression should be positive since the exchange rate should be mean reverting over time.
Ultimately, this result is often found with a large enough time horizon. The literature suggests that
the noise from short-run volatility averages out over time, so that prediction power increases.
The following framework of the monetary exchange-rate model is similar to what is used
by Evans and Chakraborty (2008). The model assumes purchasing power parity, risk neutrality
and uncovered interest parity. Equations (2.3)-(2.6) summarize the economy:
/ =

$

2 = 2∗ +
∗

−

−

=

∗

∗

,

$

−$ ,

= I¸ + I 6 − I) 2 ,

= I¸ ′ + I ′6 ∗ − I) ′2 ∗

+$

(2.3)
(2.4)
(2.5a)
(2.5b)
(2.6).

Equation (2.3) represents the risk neutral expectations of future market price of foreign currency,

while equation (2.4) is the open parity condition with 2 and 2 ∗ representing domestic and foreign

interest rates respectively. The money market equilibrium is found in equation (2.5a,b), where

17

The variables / J9I $ represent the logarithmic values
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is domestic money supply,

is the domestic price, and 6 is the level of domestic output. The

final equation in the system represents the purchasing power parity condition, where

∗

is foreign

price level.

The parameters I¸ , I , and I) are constant and not state-dependent.

Evans and

Chakroborty go on to also assume that the parameters are positive. This paper deviates from
their methodology by assuming the parameters are state-dependent and follow a specific
Markovian process. This assumption can potentially provide a more concrete reason as to the
magnitude of short-run volatility generally found in these data sets. Economic agents must learn
which regime they are experiencing, where under learning may update after multiple periods.

For this analysis, I assume that the parameter I) follows a two state Markov process. The

parameter evolves according to the transition matrix,

where & = +

,- ./0

2, 3 = 1, 2 with

,-

&=Ÿ

)

)

))

¢,

being the probability that l

= 3 given that l = 2. I further

assume that the transition matrix is non-absorbent, thus taken to be recurrent and aperiodic

implying a unique stationary distribution.18 The literature reveals that the parameter I) , can be

thought of as the interest semi-elasticity of money demand. More intuitively this parameter

represents the sensitivity of money demand to changing interest rates. Moreover, given equation

(2.4), I) ultimately reflects the difference in the fundamental value of the exchange rate from its
current market value.

This system solves to yield the forward looking, non-linear, reduced form in equation (2.7)
¹(l )$ = º + I) (l ) $

18

This assumption has been outlined in Reed (2014)

+™ .

(2.7)
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Where the intercept term19 º = (I Ģ − I¸ ), the coefficient ¹(l ) = 1 + I) (l ) and ™ = (
I (6 − 6 ∗ )) represents the fundamentals20.

−

∗

−

Furthermore, the fundamental component is

assumed to follow an exogenous AR(1) process:
™ = ‡™

+² ,

where the persistence factor ‡ is close to one but is assumed to be 0 < ‡ < 1 and that ²

represents white noise.

MEAN-SQUARE STABILITY
Evans and Chakraborty follow up the autoregressive assumption of the fundamentals by further

assuming that the process ™ has compact support. This essentially guarantees the process
exhibits finite moments of all orders.

Essentially, this technical assumption ensures the

exogenous process follows the theoretical learning results.

This paper deviates from that

assumption by adopting the solution method of Lubik and Schorfheide (2003, 2004).
Like Lubik and Schorfheide, I assume that the reduced form model represents the
combination of the minimum state variable solution and the first-order moving average component
which represents the determinate and indeterminate components of the solution respectively.
Using the framework found in Farmer, Waggoner, and Zha (2009), I begin by postulating the MSV
solution to (2.7) and solve through the method of undetermined coefficients
Suppose that a solution exits in the form
$ = J(l )™

+ »(l )ϵt

(2.8)

where J(l ) and »(l ) represent the Markov switching rational expectations coefficients. Then it
can be shown that a solution exists if,

J
¹ −
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)
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− )‡
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Assuming similar parameter values for the foreign and home countries eliminates the constant term in the
reduced form equation.
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From the MSV solutions, the indeterminate solution or “bubble condition” can be expressed in
terms of the moving average component ½ and is shown to be dependent on the coefficient
, l )¹(l )). To see this first assume that the MSV can be rewritten to include the

(1 + (l

indeterminate component ½ ,

½ = $ − (J(l )™

+ »(l )ϵt )

(2.9)

and that by using Eq. (2.7) a solution to ½ can be defined to be
½ = +¹(l ).

½

.

The solution can be rearranged in the expectation error form and becomes

where

where

A

XA

,,-

A

=½

− ¹(l )½

, l )¹(l )½ + 7(l

)( ²

+8

Y = 0. The expectational error equation yields,

= (l

must satisfy the condition that

number and 8

+

)

)

)

=

(2.10)
)

)

+

)) ))

= 0 and m is any real

is any i.i.d bounded stochastic process with mean zero and independence from

other errors.

The solution to equation (2.10) can be given in the following form:
½

= +1 + (l

, l )¹(l ).½ + 7(l

)( ²

+8

).

Therefore we can see that the stability of the indeterminate solution depends on the eigenvalues

of the coefficient matrix before ½ . To be considered mean square stable and thus e-stable, the

following definition from Farmer et al. applies

Definition 1 (mean square stable) A stochastic process : is mean square stable if there exist
real numbers „ and ¾ such that

lim

%→W

X:

%Y

=„
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lim

%→W

X: ) % Y = ¾

Farmer et al. describe this condition as an important conclusion since it defines the existence of
the second moments and thus allows for econometric testing to be done. In my earlier research
I have shown that if a series is considered mean-square stable that the implication for learning is
that economic agents would be able to learn the rational expectations solution. Furthermore, it is
important to note that MSS is similar to the covariance stationary conditions set forth by Hamilton
(1994) but generally are considered slightly weaker. Moreover for a constant-parameter, linear
model, the conditions created by Blanchard and Kahn are equivalent to MSS.
In order to create more tractable stability conditions I assume that for the model state 2 is
considered the indeterminate regime. Then a continuum of solutions exists for state 2 whereas
state 1 has a unique solution. To begin, I define (l

constraint on (l

, l ):

= −1,

and

Assuming then that

,,-

)

= −1,

)

, l ) and 7(l

=

)

,

))

=

)

))

7 = 0, 7) = 1.

> 0 ∀ 2 J9I 3 = 1,2 then, ½
¹

)

is equal to

0 2/ l = 1 J9I l

=1

0 2/ l = 2 J9I l

=1

½ +( ²

+8

) 2/ l = 1 J9I l

=2

+( ²

+8

) 2/ l = 2 J9I l

= 2.

ÀÁ
½
ÂÁÁ

) in conjunction with the
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Using the proof found in Farmer et al.: the series ½
ÀÁ

%

is bounded as $ → ∞, and thus determinate,

i.f.f. ÃÂ Á Ã < 1.2122 It is worth noting that this definition of determinacy under mean-square stability
ÁÁ

coincides with the same definition presented in my earlier research. This result satisfies the
thought that the spectral radius of the eigenvalues must be modulus one for mean square stability
to occur.
By introducing this change, the influence of a bubble solution can be more thoroughly
analyzed through mean-square stability. This sentiment is echoed closely by Farmer et al. who
argue that indeterminacy can arise from the sunspot solution since the error term may create a
non-stationary process when a unit root is present. In a monetary model, this qualitative feature
is very important as changes in monetary policy can give rise to destabilization since shocks will
be propagated through the series. This occurs because of the serial dependency found in many
monetary variables including exchange rates.
To explore this further, the range of values that would prevent a bubble type solution can
be identified by assuming the rate of persistency found in the second regime.

Empirical

estimations identify that the monetary fundamentals experience a two-state regime with each
state showing a very high level of persistency. Therefore by assuming a persistency of 0.99, 0.95,
0.8, and 0.5 I find that interest semi-elasticity of money demand should be greater than 0.005,
0.02, 0.1, and 0.3 respectively. As I will show in the section, reasonable estimates place the
interest semi-elasticity of money demand at values of .2 and .08 for quarterly data. For regime
persistency levels below 0.95 this could point to why some bubble solutions could occur. This
conclusion is an important result of this paper.

21
22

For the full proof see Farmer et al.
This process can also be completed by assuming that state 1 is the indeterminate state and would garner a MSS

condition of Ã

ÀÁ

ÂÁ

Ã < 1.
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Table 1. Solutions for mean-square stability
¹))
¹)
< 1 J9I
<1
))

I) 2 >

I) 1 >

)

Oℎ 9 $
= 2 J9I $ = 2
0.99
0.95
0.8

0.5

0.005

0.3

0.02

0.1

Oℎ 9 $
= 2 J9I $ = 1
0.1
0.25
0.5

0.6

0.7

0.2

0.5

0.3

Note that only the real numbers are reported as the absolute value
produces imaginary numbers

ADAPTIVE LEARNING
Agents are assumed to form the expected future exchange values by first generating their
Perceived Law of Motions (PLM). This perception begins with an estimate of the MSV solution
found in Eq. (2.8) and (2.9) creating an equation with the following form:
$ = J(l )™

+ »(l )ϵt + ½

where ² is white noise stemming from the observed fundamentals and a and b are considered

the rational expectations estimates. Since agents are expected to know the parameters but not
necessarily the model form, RE produces Eq. (2.11):
$ = J(l )™

+ »(l )² + ½ ,

(2.11)

where J(l ) J9I »(l ) are defined by the solutions found in the previous section.

As previously expressed the key feature of adaptive learning is that agents have imperfect

knowledge regarding the parameter values J(l ) J9I »(l ).

The timing of the observation

becomes critical for understanding agents’ ability to forecast future spot exchange rates. At the
end of period t-1 agents observe and collect the actual parameter values so that in time t, they
are able to use the history of the parameters up to and including t-1 in order to make their
estimation of $

. After the period t ends agents observe their forecast error and use it that to
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update the estimated coefficients for t+1. Agents continue this process until their estimates
converge with the RE estimate or diverge and produce an alternative solution. What dictates the
mapping of the PLM to the Actual Law of Motions (ALM), that is the true process the series follows,
is the e-stability condition. Again, e-stability refers to agents learning the rational expectations
solution. It has been noted by Chakraborty (2009) and Evans and Honkapohja (2001) that
different learning algorithms will produce a variety of learning behavior and not all will be e-stable.
For this analysis I rely on the algorithm of constant gain learning. Agents assumed to learn this
way are very sensitive to the forecast error observed at the end of each period. This is due to the
fixed nature of the sensitivity rather than a gradual decline of the sensitivity value found in
traditional recursive least squares learning. Moreover, Branch and Evans (2008) demonstrate that
constant gain learning can influence the cycle of bubbles and crashes found in some asset pricing.
This result underlines an important outcome found in all adaptive learning processes, that is these
beliefs inherently create serial correlation which may not exists otherwise.
Sargent describes this process of transitioning from an uncorrelated process to a serially
correlated one via a random walk forecasting model. Intuitively, agents begin to track their own
serial correlation and are able to produce recurrent bubbles because of their beliefs. Marcet and
Nicolini (2003) and Sargent, Williams, and Zha (2006b) are able to create the recurrent bubbles
and crashes in their models of hyperinflation and credit constant gain learning for the result. They
find that bubble type hyperinflationary paths are unstable under constant gain learning. For recent
monetary models, featuring constant gain learning has become very popular.

The linear

forecasting rule is shown to be similar to the reduced-form rational expectations solution. The
self-referential nature of constant gain learning makes persistence escapes from the rational
expectations estimates a very plausible possibility. This is due in part by the emphasis on recent
forecast errors. Every period, agents use a constant parameter, which remains unchanged over
time, in order to capture the sensitivity to forecast errors. To see this I begin by defining the
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J
1
parameter and shock matrices, Χ = Å Æ and Ω (l ) = Å»
™

,©

,©

Æ respectively. Then by using the

Recursive Least Squares algorithm, the estimates are produced from the following system of
equations:
Ω

,©

=Ω

,© a

w =w

+ 8w

Ç

(Ç − ΩG

+ 8(Ç Ç G − w

).

,© a

Ç

)

(2.12)
(2.13)

Agents use Eq. (2.12) to update their estimates. The gain factor is represented by 8w

Ç

where 8 the parameterized sensitivity or constant gain recognized by the agents each period.

Last period’s estimates are designated by ΩG
ΩG

,© a

Ç

,© a

and the forecasting error is defined by Ç −

. In order for agents to obtain an estimate of the exchange rate in period t, they must

first forecast the t+1 exchange rate. Agents in time t use values of the parameters in t-1 to
estimate time t values using Eq. (2.12) and (2.13). Since agents’ forecasts are dependent on the
information in the previous time period, an unannounced and unobserved regime change would
render the previous information inadequate for parameter estimation. Agents would have to
observe enough new regime outcomes in order to appropriately assign the importance on
historical parameter observations. Intuitively agents’ parameter estimates will converge slower
to the RE outcomes as well as provide the necessary shock so that agents follow a self-referential
path of estimation. Thus, agents who are assumed to be bounded in their rationality and therefore
required to estimate parameter values through constant gain learning while regime changes are
occurring may be able to better match the empirical data and offer an explanation for the forward
premium puzzle.
PARAMETERIZATION AND SIMULATION
Chakraborty and Kim attempt to include regime changes in their respective analysis by
creating an artificial structural break in the simulation of parameter values.

Chakraborty

parameterizes the intercept term in the law of motions equation to evolve according to a two-state
Markov process. This type of break was chosen arbitrarily whereas this paper employs empirical
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estimates of the evolution of the Markov process and includes them in the learning process.
Furthermore, both Kim and Chakraborty fail to recognize the importance of the regime spillover
created by the state dependent parameters. I have shown that parameter values governing
expectations on the future spot exchange rate now depend on the probability of transitioning out
of the current regime, a feature lacking in previous research.
To estimate values for the parameter choices, I use data found on the St. Louis FRED
database as well as the Bank of England and finally found through Bloomberg. Monthly values
were procured starting in January, 1989 and ending in October, 2014 producing a sample size of
309 observations. The monetary fundamentals were created by using monthly M1 estimates for
Switzerland (CHF), Japan (JPY), U.K. (GBP), and the U.S. (USD). Daily exchange rates, with the
USD being the numeraire currency, were averaged to create monthly values. Monthly forward
exchange rates looking out over 3-months were taken from the Bank of England and from
archived data from Bloomberg. Quarterly real gross domestic product was used to create monthly
estimates using a cubic spline interpolation. Newey-West standard errors were used for the OLS
regressions to account for the autocorrelation created by the spline interpolation.

The parameter choices for ¹(l ), ‡, J9I 8 play an important role for the development of the

stochastic process. The interest semi-elasticity of money demand, I) , is the parameter that I

have chosen to switch regimes. Intuitively, this parameter is sensitive to adjustments made to
the interest rate by central banks and thus could garner different values. This is contrary to the
approach taken by Chakraborty, Evans and Chakraborty, and Kim. Each study assumes that the
interest semi-elasticity value to be -0.08 for quarterly data and cite the parameterization to be
taken from Stock and Watson (1993) who find the value for annual data to be -0.02. Yet according
to Ball (2001), the interest semi-elasticity of money demand for annual data tends to be -0.05,
meaning that for quarterly data the value should be around -0.2. Assuming that the value for I)

is the negative of interest semi-elasticity of money demand and in terms of basis points value,

¹(l ) = (1 + I) (l )) , when I) (2) = 20 will be 0.048 and when I) (1) = 8, ¹ becomes 0.11.
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Moreover, offering no intuition, this body of literature assumes that the structural change will occur
in the intercept term of the fundamentals equations to be estimated. Chakraborty finds mixed
results when searching for a break using a variety of tests. He concludes that the possibility of a
structural break appears plausible in the exchange rate series for JPY/USD and the GBP/USD
therefore supporting the use of constant gain learning. I find evidence of a structural break
occurring by running a Markov-switching dynamic regression. By allowing the constant term as
well as the persistence parameters attached to the AR(1) and AR(2) components of the JPY/USD
and GBP/USD exchange rates to be state-dependent I find significant evidence of a two-regime
model. The SBIC value confirmed that a two-state model was preferable to a three-state. As
expected, the CHF/USD exchange rate was modeled best by a one-regime model corroborating
the pegged exchange rate regime Switzerland has historically experienced.23
Furthermore, the value for the gain parameter has inherent implications for agents learning

the rational expectations solutions. Branch and Evans indicate that common values found for 8

range from 0.01 to 0.1, where larger values for the gain parameter often lead to escapes from the
RE solution. Whereas Orphanides and Williams (2005) suggest that for quarterly data a gain
value of 0.02 is ideal. I choose values in this range to observe the effect on escaping the RE
solution and producing a bubble like outcome. This outcome is further suggested by Kim who
uses constant gain learning and a shift in fundamental values as the basis for a structural break.
This paper uses the fundamental process as the basis for a structural change but again
emphasizes that this regime shift happens in the parameter of I) .

Additionally, Kim finds that the persistent nature of the fundamental process is contingent

on introducing structural breaks into the series. Like Kim, I find that the value of ‡ is shown to be

highly persistent in the one-regime case for all exchange rate series but only the USD/JPY
identified a unit root. As state-dependent parameters were introduced, the first state for the

23

For the full set of figures and tables please see Appendix A.
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USD/GBP fundamentals exhibited high levels of persistency but was significantly less than one.
All fundamental values for the second state failed to reject the null hypothesis that ρ=1. Table 2
captures the effect that the regimes have on the fundamental components. The monetary
fundamentals for the Swiss Franc exemplifies the change in persistence as it now fails to be
significantly lower than unity.
Table 2. Monetary Fundamentals AR(1)
™ = (l ) + ‡(l )™
+²

State
1

State
2

GBP

JPY

CHF

ρ

0.995*
(0.003)

0.997
(0.001)

0.998*
(0.003)

α

0.017
(0.014)

-0.001
(0.001)

-0.006
(0.009)

R2

0.99

0.97

0.99

ρ

0.997*
(0.001)

1.003**
(0.000)

0.999
(0.001)

α

4.760*
(0.414)

11.397
(75.046)

-23.330
(64.701)

0.99
(0.004)

0.99
(0.005)

0.95
(0.028)

ρ

1.072
(0.050)

1.003
(0.021)

1.000
(0.000)

α

4.85
(0.413)

11.397
(75.046)

-23.330
(64.701)

0.59
(0.199)

0.63
(0.170)

0.99
(0.011)

))

Note that * denotes significance at the 95% level, where H0:
ρ=1 and H0: α=0. Also, the notation ** identifies a value
significantly greater than 1.

This outcome supports the argument found in Chakraborty that highly persistent fundamental
series will often contribute to the negative direction of the estimated coefficient on the forward
premium. He further concludes that as the persistence declines, the negative sign found from the
regression on the premium tends to vanish.
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As for each fundamental series the SBIC criterion suggests that the structural breaks
follow a two-state Markov process which was preferable to a three-state process. Moreover
Figure 1 below compares the transition probabilities for each monetary fundamentals series.
The transition probabilities suggest that no state for each fundamental series is absorbing.
It is also noted that no state has consistently higher variance among the fundamentals. This is
a different result from Kim, who found that some regimes exhibited a significantly higher variance
than other regimes.
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Figure 1. Transition Probabilites and Monetary Fundamentals for GBP/USD,
CHF/USD, and JPY/USD
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These observations lead to an important conclusion regarding the use of constant gain
parameter. Recent research suggests that constant gain learning properly represents agents
beliefs when they believe structural shifts can occur. Studies from Bullard and Eusepi (2005),

79
Sargent and Williams (2005) among others intuitively argue that agents will place a considerable
amount of weight on recent data when continuous structural shifts are apparent.
To exemplify the forward premium puzzle, Table 3 below outlines the regression of
monthly depreciation on the 3-month forward premium. As Fama expressed, the coefficient on
the forward premium theoretically should be one but often shows significant deviations from this
value. The coefficients that I find are typical of this literature. For each series, the coefficients
are significantly lower than unity and negative for the CHF/USD and JPY/USD exchange rate
premiums.

Researchers continue to offer explanations for this phenomenon, with adaptive

learning now taking center stage. In order to explain the deviation from unity coupled with a
negative direction, I create a simulated learning structure that adheres to the assumption that
agents have a difficult time estimating the theoretical parameters under constant gain learning
when facing persistent structural breaks.

Table 3. Regression of monthly depreciation
on 3-month forward premium
$ −$ = +7 / −$ +º
GBP/USD CHF/USD JPY/USD
-0.007
-0.003*
-0.002*
@ÈÉe
(0.050)
(0.001)
(0.001)
7ÊÈÉe
µ)

n=

0.001*
(.011)

-0.446*
(0.071)

-0.497*
(0.066)

0.0004
309

0.11
309

0.16
309

Note that * denotes signifiance at the 95% level, where
for H0: α =0 while for H0: β=1.

Furthermore, I estimate the Markov switching maximum likelihood estimate for 7 and find similar

results to the single regime OLS estimates. Table 4 shows that the forward premium regression
for the GBP/USD results in very different regime coefficients with one state failing to be statistically
different from unity, whereas JPY/USD displays quantitatively similar parameter estimates to the
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single regime OLS. It should be noted that due to the Swiss exchange rate regime persistence,
multiple regime could not be estimated using standard maximization techniques.

$

Table 4. Dynamic Markov
Regression of monthly
depreciation on 3-month forward
premium
− $ = (l ) + 7(l ) / − $ + º
GBP/USD JPY/USD
-0.025
-0.055*
Ë ÌÍÎ
(0.057)
(0.009)
-0.001
Ë) ÌÍÎ -0.262
(0.314)
(.002)
®
7 ÌÍÎ

®
7) ÌÍÎ
n=

0.004*
(.013)
0.692
(0.692)

-0.538*
(0.292)
-0.460*
(0.066)

309

309

Note that * denotes signifiance at the 95%
level, where for H0: α =0 while for H0: β=1.

This exercise in parameter estimation is encouraging as it isolates the importance of regime
switching for at least one of the series being analyzed. It provides further evidence for using state
dependent parameters in conjunction with constant gain learning.
Similar to the setup found in Evans and Chakraborty, I simulate the forward premium
regression under the assumption that economic agents are using constant gain learning to
estimate the coefficient on the forward premium. I begin by creating 1000 simulations using a
fairly large sample size, T=20,000 over a range of gains 8 > 0. I discard the first 20,000 data

points and report the mean value from the remaining sample across simulations. The simulations
were done with and without an intercept term.
simulated values for 7Ê%,< .

Table 5 presents the comparison between
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Table 5. Results from 1000 simulations of the model for sample size 360 with regime change

¹ = 8, ¹) = 20

p11=.95,
p22=.95

‡

8

no intercept avg.

8,20
8,20
8,20
8,20
8,20
8,20

0.95
0.95
0.95
0.95
0.95
0.95

0.1
0.05
0.03
0.02
0.01
0.001

0.34
0.47
0.52
0.53
0.53
0.55

8,20
8,20
8,20
8,20
8,20
8,20

0.995
0.995
0.995
0.995
0.995
0.995

0.1
0.05
0.03
0.02
0.01
0.001

8,20
8,20
8,20
8,20
8,20
8,20

0.999
0.999
0.999
0.999
0.999
0.999

0.1
0.05
0.03
0.02
0.01
0.001

7Ê%,<

t -stat

intercept avg.

7Ê%,<

t -stat

-3.69
-2.83
-2.63
-2.51
-2.63
-2.55

0.36
0.50
0.56
0.57
0.58
0.62

-3.53
-2.58
-2.28
-2.24
-2.23
-2.00

0.11
0.13
0.13
0.13
0.13
0.14

-7.06
-6.75
-6.78
-6.93
-7.08
-7.18

0.22
0.27
0.30
0.30
0.30
0.30

-4.54
-4.03
-3.79
-3.83
-3.92
-3.99

0.04
0.04
0.05
0.04
0.04
0.04

-14.55
-13.65
-13.25
-13.69
-13.96
-14.82

0.20
0.25
0.26
0.27
0.27
0.25

-4.75
-4.31
-4.22
-4.16
-4.15
-4.39

It is apparent that with the parameter choices assumed from the previous section, learning
simulates the data very well. With moderately persistent regimes, the gain parameter fails to
account for the theorized value of the coefficient. Moreover, as the regimes becomes more
persistent I am able to show that agents would be able to learn the theorized value of premium
coefficient. This is an important finding. Even though the persistence of the fundamentals shows
that a unit root may be present in the process, highly persistent fundamentals can still result in a
coefficient similar to the theoretical value of one. This appears to be due in part to the persistence
of the regimes. These findings are somewhat complementary to that of Evans and Chakraborty.
They express the intuition behind this phenomenon is that when agents are faced with perpetual

shock to the fundamentals, essentially when ‡ = 1, agents must track the progress more closely

with the gain parameter and this equates to using a larger gain. This was not the case though

when the fundamentals do not need to be accounted for so intently. This paper finds that regime
persistence plays an important role in the formulation of the premium coefficient estimates. I find
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that when ‡ = 1, and when regimes have low persistence, agents will not achieve the unity
estimate found by Chakraborty. In fact, the estimates match very closely to the empirical estimate
for the JPY/USD forward exchange regression. Overall, regardless of the persistence agents
prefer using a smaller gain parameter. Intuitively this behavior is similar to placing smaller and
smaller importance on past observations. I believe this is due solely to the introduction of regimes
into the learning analysis and is a crucial finding of this paper.

Table 6. Results from 1000 Simulations of the Model for Sample Size 360 with Regime Change: Comparison of Regime Persistence
Intercept, median
No Intercept, median
8
‡
t -stat
t -stat
¹ = 8, ¹) = 20
7Ê%,<
7Ê%,<

p11=0.9, p22=0.9
p11=.99, p22=.95
p11=.99, p22=.99
p11=.99, p22=.99
p11=.999, p22=.999
p11=.999, p22=.999
p11=1, p22=1
p11=1, p22=1
p11=1, p22=1
p11=1, p22=1

8,20
8,20
8,20
8,20
8,20
8,20
8,20
8,20
8,20
8,20

0.999
0.95
0.95
0.95
0.95
0.95
0.9
0.95
0.95
0.99

0.1
0.01
0.01
0.1
0.01
0.1
0.01
0.01
0.1
0.01

0.021
0.8066*
0.8091*
0.200
0.907*
0.105
0.9623*
0.9159*
0.121
0.4366*

-30.51
-0.65
-0.67
-3.55
-0.27
-3.08
-0.17
-0.25
-3.81
-0.76

0.128
0.9014*
0.8815*
0.204
0.9882*
0.106
1.0117*
0.9996*
0.123
0.5492*

-9.92
-0.31
-0.40
-3.49
-0.03
-3.76
0.05
0.00
-3.78
-0.57

Note that * denotes significance at the 95% level.

Table 7. Results from 1000 Simulations of the Model for Sample Size 360 with Regime Change: Comparison of Fundamental
Persistence
Intercept, median
No Intercept, median
8
‡
t -stat
t -stat
¹ = 8, ¹) = 20
7Ê%,<
7Ê%,<

p11=0.9, p22=0.9
p11=0.9, p22=0.95
p11=0.95, p22=0.95
p11=0.99, p22=0.99
p11=1, p22=1
p11=1, p22=1
p11=1, p22=.99

8,20
8,20
8,20
8,20
8,20
8,20
8,20

1
1
1
1
1
1
1

0.1
0.1
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.1
0.1

0.000
0.002
0.002
0.005
-0.084
-0.040
-0.034

-167.39
-88.21
-84.60
-17.91
-1.59
-4.31
-4.25

0.062
0.105
0.129
0.419*
-0.412
-0.098
-0.079

-15.62
-7.68
-7.09
-1.00
-1.81
-4.44
-4.36

Note that * denotes significance at the 95% level.

CONCLUSIONS
The forward premium puzzle has seen a variety of macroeconomic methodologies
introduced in order to explain away the empirical results that Fama first observed. Recently,
adaptive learning literature from Evans and Chakraborty, Chakraborty, and Kim, has explored the
role that recursive least squares plays in explaining the forward premium puzzle. As it happens,
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adaptive learning does offer an explanation of many of the key empirical characteristics outlined
by Fama.
This paper contributes to the body of literature by introducing state dependent parameters
governed by Markov switching regimes. Because of the complications that occur due to the
spillover effects from changing regimes, traditional expectational stability analysis needs to be
modified. These features impart a key distinction between this paper and the previous body of
research. Furthermore, this paper assumes that agents learn using the method of constant gain
rather than decreasing gain.
Constant gain learning provides agents with a plausible method to moderate their error
when forecasting the forward exchange rate. Moreover, by parameterizing the model with a
constant term instead of one that decreases over time, I can simulate the differences in perceived
gain to determine the empirical importance. I believe that constant gain learning is necessary in
this macroeconomic climate as it lends itself to persistent data series, which is observed in both
the monetary fundamentals and exchange rate series. It should also be mentioned that constant
gain learning can be a contributing factor of deviations from the rational expectations solution.
Deviating from the canonical literature, mean square stability captures the competing
regime effects, noted by Farmer et al. and produces tangible conditions to measure e-stability. I
find that there is a very distinct possibility that the regimes trigger an indeterminate bubble solution
even under robust parameterization. This is an important result, as it points toward agents failing
to reach the rational expectations solutions under the assumption of regime dependent
parameters. Providing further evidence for why the forward premium puzzle exists.
Empirically, the coefficient from the forward premium OLS regression shows the standard
signs of deviating from the theoretical value of unity. The downward bias, so thoroughly analyzed
by Evans and Chakraborty, is present in the empirical estimates. Furthermore, this paper uses
MLE techniques to observe the regime changes in the exchange rate series. As expected, the
regimes produce slightly different results than what has been reported historically for single
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regime regressions. Nonetheless, both estimates produce the observed forward premium puzzle.
As for the estimated parameter values, I find that the monetary fundamentals series is extremely
persistent but not divergent under a single regime for the GBP/USD and CHF/USD series, but
found an unstable eigenvalue for the JPY/USD series. Estimating the persistence under the
assumption of two-regimes produces a unit root for all three series in the second state and for
JPY/USD and CHF/USD in the first state. Moreover, I found that a two-state regime was sufficient
for estimating the monetary fundamentals and the exchange rate series. The two states were
highly persistent but not absorbing. These estimates provided support for the parameterization
required for simulating the forward premium regression under constant gain learning.
The simulation results under state-dependent constant gain learning revealed the
importance of both the persistency of the fundamentals and the regimes.

The first result

corroborated the results found common to recent learning literature but the second result remains
a unique finding and an important one to this research. Moreover, I am able to simulate a premium
coefficient which matches the empirical findings by using a parameterization estimated from the
data. This finding points toward the importance of using constant gain adaptive learning to explain
the forward premium puzzle.
Furthermore, I was able to simulate the theoretical value of the premium coefficient by
adjusting the persistence of the regimes even under highly persistent values for the fundamental
series. This again points to the importance of not only the fundamental series but of the possibility
of regime changes. Under the presence of regimes, simulations revealed that smaller constant
gain parameters performed better than larger gain values. This conclusion seems to be a product
of agents anticipating regime changes, therefore preferring to place lower emphasis on current
estimation errors.
The results of this paper conclude that in conjunction with the constant gain adaptive
learning approach state-dependent parameters which follow Markov switching transition matrix
should be a used in future empirical applications of the forward premium puzzle.
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APPENDIX A
Proof for Lemma 1

Let 6 be a solution of the stacked system. By substituting the moving average component

into the stacked system and using the definition of M% ,

It follows that the process O is a solution of

XO

Γ% O =

Y.

Let Q, be any matrix with orthonormal columns s.t. the column space of Q, is the span of

the support of O 1n% C,p , Oℎ

1n% C,p denotes the indicator function that is one if $ = 2 and zero

otherwise. Let R, be the dimension of the column space of Q, . Since it is shown that O is a
solution to the stacked system, the following equation holds almost surely, with a probability limit
of one.
Γ, ™ = cΓ% O ÏO = ™, $ = 2d = X XO

= XO

XO

i

|O = ™, $ = 2Y = h

,-

-C

XO

Y|O = ™, $ = 2Y

|O = ™, $ = 2, $

Because the column space of Q- is the span of the support of O

|O = ™, $ = 2, $

= 3Y.

1n%

C-p ,

it follows that

= 3Y is almost surely in the column space of Q- . This and the fact that

the column space of Q, is the span of the support of O 1n% C,p , implies that there exists a R- : R,

matrix Φ,- such that

Define 8 = O − Q% Φefa

i

G
,% Q% a

O

Γ, Q, = h
-C

,- Q- Φ,- .

. Because O , and hence 8 , is almost surely in the column

space of Q% , 8 = Q% Q%G 8 . The last remaining component of the proof is to show
Since
cQ% Q%G 8 d =

XO − Q% Φefa

G
,% Q% a

O

Y

cQ% Q%G 8 d = 0.
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i

= Γ% a O

= Γ% a O

−h

Where the last equality holds because O

-C

G
% ,- Q- Φefa ,- Q% a

− Γ% a Q% a Q%G a O

O

= 0.

is almost surely in the column space of Q% a .

Proof of Corollary 1
The original proof follows almost directly from Costa et al. but for certain timing
conventions, I present the proof from Farmer et al. with slight modifications.

From Lemma 1, 6 has been shown to be solution of the stacked system. Following the results

of determinacy, one must show that the process, 6 is MSS if and only if the

•

’? +‘,- .“ ≥ 1.

Since I have defined the shock process to be mean-zero and independent of the state, $ , for any

6 it must be that

X6 Y = XO Y J9I

X6 6 G Y = cM% N NG M%G d + cM% N 8 G Q%G Q% d + cQ% Q%G 8 NG M%G d + XO O G Y.

Continue to let N and 8 to be MSS and independent of $ , it follows that the first three terms will
converge as t increases without bound. Thus 6 will be MSS if and only if O is MSS.
•

To show that O is MSS, I first appeal to the result that O is MSS if and only if

’? +‘,- .“ < 1. This can be done by showing that the lim XO O G Y exists if and only if ? +‘,- . <
→W

1 and then showing that if ? +‘,- . < 1 this implies lim XO Y exists. Note that
i

cO O 1n% C-p d = h
G

,C

→W

,- Λ ,-

cO

O G 1n% a

G
C-p dΛ ,-

+ Q- Q-G X8 8 G 1n% C-p Y Q- Q-G .

Since we have defined 8 to be mean-zero and independent of the Markov process it follows that
c+8 1n% C-p .+O G 1n% a

C-p .d

= 0.

Define linear operators
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i

Š(Ç , … , Çi ) = (h
,C

where Ç- is an 9 : 9 matrix. Let

G
, Λ , Ç, Λ ,

i

,…,h
,C

G
,i Λ ,i Ç, Λ ,i

w(Ç , … , Çi ) = Ç + ⋯ + Çi ,

),

Σ-, = cO O G 1n% C-p d,
Σ = +Σ , , … , Σi, .,

Ω-, = Q- Q-G c8 8 G 1n% C-p dQ- Q-G ,
Ω = +Ω , , … , Ωi, ..

Since 8 is MSS, lim X8 8 G Y = ΩÒ for some symmetric and positive semi-definite matrix ΩÒ . It
→W

follows from the definition of 8 that

where

-

Ω = lim Ω = + Q Q G ΩÒ Q Q G , … ,

G
G
i Qi Qi ΩÒ Qi Qi .,

→W

is the ergodic probability that $ = 3. By iterating the linear operators I find
Σ = Š (Σ¸ ) + h Š
–C

–

Ω– .

Also, since T is a linear operator, its matrix representation is given by
™ «+Š(Ç , … , Çi ). = ? +Λ,- .™ «(Ç , … , Çi ),
where the vec operator stacks the columns of the matrices into a column vector.
•

So, if

’? +‘,- .“ < 1, then
lim XO O G Y = lim h Š
→W

→W

–C

–

Ω– = h Š – (Ω),
–C¸

where the last term is a convergent series. The other scenario which needs to be addressed is if

O is MSS so that lim XO O G Y exists and does not depend on the initial condition Σ¸ , then it must
→W

be the case that lim Š (Σ¸ ) = 0 for any Σ¸ = (Σ
→W

,¸ , … , Σi,¸ )

such that Σ-,¸ is symmetric and positive

semi-definite. Branch et al. reveal that if lim Š (Σ¸ ) = 0 for any Σ¸ = (Σ
→W

,¸ , … , Σi,¸ )

such that Σ-,¸
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is symmetric and positive semi-definite, then it is the case that lim Š (Σ¸ ) = 0 for any Σ¸ , which
implies that

•

→W

’? +‘,- .“ < 1. This is because

? +Λ ,- . = I2JK(Q, ⨂Q, )? +Φ,- .I2JK(Q,G ⨂Q,G ),

The non-zero eigenvalues of ? +Λ ,- . are the same as the non-zero eigenvalues of ? +Φ,- ., which
implies the spectral radius of Λ ,- is equal to the spectral radius of Φ,- or,
•

’? +‘,- .“ =

•

’? +Λ ,- .“.

Thus it has been shown that lim XO O G Y exists if and only if ? +‘,- . < 1.
→W

Proof of Lemma 2

Let 6, identify as an RDE. Let / = (6, $|$

and $ conditional on $

$

($|$

, included in Ω

= 2, Ω

), where / is the joint density of 6

= 2 and on all other time t-1 information, not including current and past

. Also, let / , = (6|Ω

) be the density for 6, conditional on Ω

= 2) be the conditional density of $ given $

= 2.

Where / ($ = 3|$

, and / =

= 2) = &,- .

Expectations can be computed then, as follows:
(6

|$ = 2, Ω ) = Ó 6/

= Ó 6/

(6, $|$ = 2, Ω ) I$I6

(6|$, $ = 2, Ω ) /($|$ = 2)I$I6

= Ó 6/ % (6| Ω ) /($|$ = 2)I$I6
= ∑- &,-

6-

.

This representation of expectations for 6 can be used to make sure the stacked system is
satisfied.

To ensure E-stability, Branch et al. construct a proposition which uses the forward looking
expectational difference equation, similar to the stacked system.

They conclude that MSV

forecasting using an adaptive learning algorithm, like least squares, will converge to the unique
RDE and this be E-stable.
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Proof of Lemma 3

Given the PLM 6 = o($ ) + q($ ) , expectations are state contingent, where $ = 3 for all 3 =

1, … ,

(6

implies
|$ = 3) =

-

o(1) +

-) o(2) +

⋯+

The state-contingent ALM or T-map is then
o(3) → 7- (

q(3) → 7- ’

-

-

-< o(

o(1) +

q(1) +

)+’

-) o(2) +

-) q(2) +

-

q(1) +

⋯+

⋯+

-< o(

-< q(

-) q(2) +

⋯+

-< q(

)“ ‡

))

)“ ‡ + 8-

To match the stacked system from equation (8), the ALM and associated T-map can also be
stacked so that under the stacked PLM, 6> = o + q , q = (q(1)G , … , q( )G )G , J9I o =

(o(1)G , … , o( )G )′. The T-map is given by

<
Š(o, q)G = ’+⊕<
-C 7- .(& ⊗ EF )o, +⊕-C 7- .(& ⊗ EF )q‡ + 8“,

and the RDE is a fixed point of the stacked T-map. Note, Š: ℝF<Z ⊕ ℝF<Z– → ℝF<Z ⊕ ℝF<Z– .
The eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrices

ÔŠŽ = +⊕<
-C 7- .(& ⊗ EF )

ÔŠ• = ‡′⨂X+⊕<
-C 7- .(& ⊗ EF )Y
Provide the results for E-Stability, i.e. E-Stability requires real parts less than one, so that the Estability condition is implied by the CLDC.
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The first chapter of this dissertation analyzes the necessary and sufficient
conditions for stability under recurring structural changes. Using a finite state Markov
process to model stochastically evolving, state-dependent parameters I find that by
employing the conditions unique to mean-square stability, the minimum state variable
(MSV) solution, found in non-linear models of this reduced form, is also stable in the
learning sense. However, the choice of parameter values limits the robustness of this
result. Furthermore, to illustrate this outcome I develop empirical results for a model similar
to Cagan’s 1956 work on hyperinflation for Germany and the United States. I find that
during the time of active currency market intervention, monetary policy was not meansquare stable for both the U.S. and Germany.
In the second chapter, I analyze if economic agents could have learned the policy
decisions of the Plaza and Louvre accords. New techniques in Markov switching Adaptive
Learning models (MSAL), shows that economic agents would not have learned the rational
expectations outcomes of exchange rate interventions and therefore contributed to
exchange rate overshooting and excess volatility during this time. These finding help to
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explain why forecasts of short-term exchange rates have historically been poor while longrun forecasts do much better at matching the data.
The third chapter analyzes empirical data from the forward exchange rate premium
to interpret the puzzle, made famous by Fama, using Markov Switching Adaptive Learning
(MSAL) techniques. This chapter addresses the need for using Mean-Square Stability as
the criterion for stability rather than traditional stability conditions. Moreover this chapter
observes the possibility for a self-referential solution to occur under specific conditions
similar to what is found empirically. Furthermore, this chapter is able to replicate the results
typically found during the analysis using a Markov-switching constant gain model, indicating
that economic agents may posses some form of bounded rationality or information
asymmetry which produces the observed bias. A central tenant of this chapter is that agents
facing a regime which tend to produce the forward premium bias present in most empirical
applications even in the face of highly persistent fundamentals.
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